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Articles 
ORIGINALISM'S MISPLACED FIDELITY: 
"ORIGINAL" MEANING IS NOT OBJECTIVE 
Tara Smith* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Although Originalism has been systematically critiqued and 
repudiated by a number of scholars in law and philosophy, it has 
proven an impressively resilient doctrine. It is not hard to 
understand why. Its basic thesis-that the meaning of the 
Constitution should be settled by reference to the original 
understanding of those who enacted it-can seem to embody the 
very essence of fair play, expressing as straightforward an 
obligation as the obligation to keep one's word or to abide by 
the rules of a game one has entered into. Regardless of what 
various alternative theories of proper interpretive method may 
propose, it is difficult to stray far from the pure, fair-minded 
appeal of the Originalist brand of respect for the rule of law. 
Don't we have to be faithful to what the lawmakers were doing? 
To what they took themselves to be doing? Surely it would be 
wrong to set that aside and declare: "different times, different 
rules," without formally changing those rules through the 
prescribed procedures. To claim to be following written laws 
while departing from what the writers meant by them would 
actually eviscerate those laws, "respecting" the law in name only. 
Originalism insists that the rule of law requires fidelity on the 
part of those who apply the law to those who make the law. 
"Unlike the democratic visionaries, the rights theorists, or the 
natural lawyers," Keith Whittington has observed, "originalists 
do not look past the Constitution to a larger and prior moral 
commitment. '' 1 Rather, Originalism is faithful to the 
* Professor. Department of Philosophy. University of Texas at Austin. 
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MEANING. ORIGINAL biTE NT. AND ]L"DICIAL REVIEW 44 ( 1999). 
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Constitution itself, however commendable or flawed it may be. 
To the extent that we sincerely seek to interpret the law, 
Originalists contend, their methodology is the only means of 
doing so. 2 
In this paper, I wish to examine two recently articulated and 
very persuasive defenses of a particular. resurgent form of 
Originalism. The reasons for doing so require a little more 
background. 
II. THREE SCHOOLS OF ORIGINALISM 
Originalism, again. is the thesis that the meaning of the 
Constitution should be settled by reference to the original 
understanding of those who enacted it.' Joseph Story, in his 
widely read Commentaries on the Constitution, provides a clear 
statement of this principle: "the first and fundamental rule in the 
interpretation of all instruments is. to construe them according 
to the sense of the terms, and the intention of the parties. "4 A 
few decades later, we see Originalism at work in Justice Roger 
B. Taney's majority opinion in Dred Scott v Sandford, explaining 
that the Constitution "speaks not only with the same words, but 
with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it 
came from the hands of the framers, and was voted on and 
adopted by the people of the United States." Correlatively, 
Taney held that the "duty of the court" is to interpret the 
Constitution "as we find it, according to its true intent and 
meaning when it was adopted."' 
In more recent years, scholars have heeded the difference 
between reliance on the original intent behind certain language 
2. /d. at 218. Whittington distinguishes interpretation from constitutional 
.. construction ... /d. at 7-15: see also RANDY E. BARNETT. RESTORING THE LOST 
COSSTITUTIOS 118-25 (2004). Originalism's durability is probably also a reflection of its 
competition. It takes a theory to beat a theory. Barnett has observed, and the 
shortcomings of alternatives have often seemed only too apparent. /d. at 92. Without a 
clearly superior replacement. thinkers frequently return to Originalism. attempting to 
carve out an enhanced and fortified version of it. For a brief discussion of the failings of 
several non-Originalist theories. see Tara Smith. Whv Originalism Won't Die: Common 
.'vtistakes in Co,";,peting Theories of Judicial lnterpret~tion. 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
PoL·Y 159. 230-87 (2007). 
3. My focus will be on interpretation of the Constitution. although much will apply 
to statutory and regulatory interpretation. as well. 
4. I JOSEPH STORY. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES.§ 400. at 305 (1833). Story's volume went through several editions and foreign 
translations throughout the 19th century. 
5. Dred Scott v. Sandford. 60 U.S. 393. 405 (1856). 
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and reliance on the language itselC What a person intends and 
what he actually says or writes are not always the same thing. 
Intentions can be much more difficult to ascertain and can vary 
considerably among different lawmakers. For these reasons, 
most Originalists have moved away from the Original Intent 
view, agreeing with Antonio Scalia that '"men may intend what 
they will; but it is only the laws that they enact that bind us. "7 
While Scalia offers many valid criticisms of the Original 
Intent school, his own "Textualism," which contends that laws' 
meanings are contained within the words alone, rests upon 
serious misunderstandings of the nature of meaning. While these 
have been devastatingly exposed elsewhere. what is of 
immediate relevance is that the emphatic failings of Scalia's 
theory make it tempting to conclude that since even this better 
form of Originalism ultimately fails. Originalism itself must be a 
dead letter.s The recent work of Whittington and Randy Barnett, 
however, makes clear that such a conclusion would be 
premature. Whittington specifically criticizes Scalia's naive 
6. Notice that both Story and Taney refer to intent. as have many other 
Originalists. William Blackstone wrote that ''the fairest and the most rational method to 
interpret the will of the legislator. is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law 
was made. by signs the most natural and probable... 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTO:'-IE. 
COMMENTARIES *59. In English common law. the Chief Justice of the King's Bench in 
1611 wrote that words "shall be taken according to the ... intent of the parties." as 
quoted in JAMES A. COLAIACO. FREDERICK DOUGLASS AND THE FOURTH OF JULY 100 
(2006). More recently. Robert Bork has written that "a judge is to apply the Constitution 
according to principles intended by those who ratified the document." ROBERT H. BoRK. 
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143 (1990). 
7. ANTONIN SCALIA. A MATTER OF INTERPRETATIOI' 17 (1997). Barnett credits 
Lysander Spooner with similar insights. BARNETT. supra note 2. at xiii. For more 
discussion of this difference. see Smith. supra note 2. I do not mean to imply that all the 
figures quoted or who have ever referred to intent in explaining Originalism were aware 
of this distinction and deliberately chose to adopt Original Intent Originalism. Bork. in 
particular. explicitly denied that authors' subjective intentions are what is pertinent. 
BORK. supra note 6. at 144. Once the difference is recognized. however. an Originalist 
does need to clarify exactly which form he embraces. 
8. Among the many damning criticisms of Scalia are Paul Brest. lnterpreration and 
Interest. 34 STAN. L. REV. 765. 765-73 (1982) (arguing that judges must interpret the 
"social" as well as the written text): Paul Brest. The Misconceived Quest for the Original 
Understanding. 60 B.U. L. REV. 204. 228-38 (1980) (arguing that non-Originalist 
interpretation better serves constitutional disputes than originalist interpretation.): 
Ronald Dworkin. Comment. in SCALIA. supra note 7. at 115-27: Richard A. Epstein. A 
Common Lawyer Looks at Constitutional Interpretation. 72 B.U. L. REV. 699 (1992): 
David Sosa. The Unintentional Fallacy. 86 CAL. L. REV. 919 ( 1998) (arguing that the plain 
meaning approach does not apply well to novel circumstances and that language is often 
underdefined): Cass R. Sunstein. Interpreting Statutes in the Regulaton· State, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 405. 504 (1989) (arguing that. "language ·by itself lacks meaning"): Laurence 
Tribe. Comment. in id. at 65-94: Posting of Timothy Sandefur to Positive Liberty. 
http://www.positiveliberty.com/2005/11/scalias-basic-contradiction-or-words-mean-a-
potentially-infinite-number-of-things.html (Nov. 3. 2005): see also Smith. supra note 2. 
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portrait of language and recognizes that language does not carry 
meaning apart from intentions, as Scalia maintains. "Written 
words cannot speak for themselves," Whittington observes. A 
text cannot be taken as autonomous: we cannot dismiss intent 
entirely.9 
Moreover, a third form of Originalism, the "Original 
Meaning" or "Public Understanding" school, has recently been 
gaining a striking measure of academic respect, increasingly 
embraced not only by those one might expect (conservatives 
frustrated by the failure of its Intent and Textualist cousins), but 
by figures from across the ideological spectrum. A number of 
liberal constitutional theorists in the past several years have, on 
essentially Originalist grounds, come to interpret the Second 
Amendment as protecting an individual's right to bear arms 
rather than a state's collective right to arm militias. (Sandy 
Levinson, Laurence Tribe, and Akhil Amar are among these 
figures.) 10 John 0. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport have 
argued that Originalism is the most sensible interpretive method 
for legal Pragmatism to endorse. 11 Jack Balkin has recently 
embraced the core Originalist premise in a piece arguing that the 
right to abortion is based on the original meaning of the 
constitutional text. 12 Balkin avers that "constitutional 
interp~et~tion requires fi~el~ty to the origi~al meani~~ of the 
ConstitutiOn and to the pnnctples that underhe the text ' · and he 
observes that "many different scholars from different political 
perspectives have embraced the idea that constitutional 
interpretation should be grounded in the text's original 
meaning." 1• 
9. WHITII!\GTON. supra note 1. at 99, 177. 210. For some of the offending Scalia 
on this. see Antonin Scalia. Law & Language. FIRST THINGS. Nov. 2005. at 44 (reviewing 
STEVEN D. SMITH. LAW'S QUANDARY (2004)). 
10. Adam Liptak. A Liberal Case for Gun Rights Helps Sway Federal Judiciary. 
N.Y. TIMES. May 7. 2007. at A18 (discussing Parker v. Dist. of Columbia 478 F. 3d 370 
(D.C. Cir. 2007). among others cases): see Sandy Levinson. The Embarrassing Second 
Amendment. 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989). In different forms. it is sometimes called New 
Originalism or Progressive Originalism. 
11. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport. A Pragmatic Defense of 
Originalism. 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 383-98 (2007). 
12. Jack M. Balkin. Abortion and Original Meaning. 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 
(2007). 
13. /d. at 293. 
14. Balkin cites Amar. Dworkin. and Kermit Roosevelt as among those embracing 
"the idea that constitutional interpretation should be grounded in the text's original 
meaning." /d. at 295 & n.8. For further discussion of this phenomenon. see BARNETI. 
supra note 2. at 91-94: James E. Fleming. Fidelity to our Imperfect Constitwion. 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1335 (1997): Jack Rakove. Fidelity Through History (or to II). 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1587 (1997). 
2009] ORIGINALISM'S MISPLACED FIDELITY 5 
This Public Understanding school is generally regarded as a 
much more viable form of Originalism, largely on the grounds 
that it offers an objective framework for understanding what the 
law is. 1' In the words of Barnett. Public Understanding 
Originalism represents an advance ·•from subjective to objective 
meaning." 16 It "seeks the public or objective meaning that a 
reasonable listener would place on the words used in the 
constitutional provision at the time of its enactment. '' 17 Those 
words should be interpreted as a normal speaker of the language 
would have understood them at that time. 1" Whittington agrees 
that "the critical originalist directive is that the Constitution 
should be interpreted according to the understanding made 
public at the time of the drafting and ratification. " 19 What unites 
all forms of Originalism is deference to history: It is facts about 
what was intended, written, or understood in the past that decide 
the meaning of laws that contemporary judges are to apply. 
Whereas the Original Intent and Textualist forms of Originalism 
do not deliver objective meaning, the distinctive strength of 
Public Understanding Originalism, allegedly. is that it does.2" 
In this paper, I shall address the two strongest defenses of 
Public Understanding Originalism that I am aware of. The first. 
embraced by Whittington, is what I will call the Popular 
Sovereignty Argument and the second, embraced by Barnett. as 
well, I will call the Written Constitution Argument. I hope to 
show that these efforts, while apparently going a further distance 
toward establishing Originalism than others, nonetheless fail to 
vindicate it. Indeed, we shall find that on analysis, the Public 
Understanding school proves every bit as subjectivist as the 
"living constitution'' theories that all Originalists wish to 
oppose.21 My thesis, in essence, is that to the extent that 
15. BARI"EIT. supra note 2. at 92. 94. 
16. /d. at 94. 
17. /d. at 92. 
18. /d. at 89. 
19. WHIITINGTO!'.". supra note 1. at 35. 
20. For an explanation of how Textualism collapses into subjectivism. see Smith. 
supra note 2. at 269-80. 
21. The type of view that Originalists seek to defeat is reflected in H.L.A. Hart's 
claim that ··a judge must act as a conscientious legislator would by deciding according to 
his own beliefs and values ... and Kermit Roosevelt's contention that courts must use 
"doctrine·· rather than constitutional meaning and that ··doctrine can be legitimate even 
if it goes beyond the meaning of the constitution ... (Balkin's characterization of 
Roosevelt as an Originalist. I think. employs rather too loose a standard.) H.L.A. HART. 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 273 (1994): KERMIT ROOSEVELT. THE MYTH OF ]LDICIAL 
ACTIVISM 42. 73 (2006): Bruce Ackerman and John Hart Elv defend theories that are 
even more paradigmatic of the "living constitution" view. See i BRL'CE ACKERMA!'.". WE 
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Originalism does reflect an undeniable truth, that truth concerns 
a comparatively innocuous claim. Its fidelity is misplaced insofar 
as it is directed at ''original" meaning rather than at the law's 
objective meaning. The latter is what the rule of law truly 
demands. Indeed. as a result of what Public Understanding 
Originalism takes the original meaning of laws to be, it actually 
fails to provide an account of how judges are to apply the law-
the very thing that it purports to be a theory of. That is, while 
Originalism plainly advocates a goal for legal interpretation 
("stick to the original meaning of the Constitution"). it does not 
offer a method for how to achieve that goal. Yet the central 
dispute over adjudication concerns how judges are to interpret 
and apply the law. Despite its admirable aspirations, in short. 
Originalism does not deliver the objective application of law that 
the rule of law demands.'2 
I shall begin by presenting the two arguments for Public 
Understanding Originalism and then proceed to critique each, in 
turn. We will see how Originalism treats words' original meaning 
in a way which is at odds with words' objective meaning.23 
Ill. THE POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY DEFENSE OF 
ORIGINALISM 
The first argument grounds Originalism in the roots of 
popular sovereignty. (This is not a novel argument so much as 
one that is revitalized in Whittington's presentation. which rests 
THE PEOPLE: FOV\DATIONS (1991): 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN. WE THE PEOPLE: 
TRANSFORMATIONS ( 1998): JOHN HARTEL Y. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST ( 1980). 
22. One might insist that Originalism does furnish a method. yet insofar as its 
.. method .. amounts to mimicry of an earlier understanding. it hardly provides guidance 
for how judges are to interpret the law. Thus it is not clear that that reading of 
Originalism would be any more charitable. I will sometimes use .. Originalism .. as a 
shorthand for Public Understanding Originalism. It should be clear from the context 
whether I am using the term in its broader or narrower. Public Understanding sense. 
While occasionally. mv phrasing might be thought to suggest that my target is the 
Original Intent view rather than Public Understanding Originalism. my contention is 
that. even though the two arguments under scrutiny claim to support a distinct. Public 
Understanding brand of Originalism. insofar as these arguments actually rely on the 
intent of the people who (in the case of the Popular Sovereignty Argument) expressed 
their will in agreeing to the Constitution and/or the intent of the people who (in the case 
of the Written Constitution Argument) wrote their will down. insofar that is considered 
the ultimate reason that we are to abide bv the Public Understanding. those people's 
intent remains pivotal. What really does the work underneath the Popular Sovereignty 
and Written Constitution arguments. in other words. is the intent of these .. sovereign .. 
people and/or the intent behind this written expression of that intent. 
23. I will not address every aspect of Whittington's and Barnett's argumentation on 
behalf of Originalism. but will focus exclusively on these two arguments. Also note that 
Barnett rejects the Popular Sovereignty Argument. (I will comment further on this later.) 
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on a more sophisticated understanding of language than is found 
in many earlier advocates who offered broadly similar 
arguments.)'~ This argument contends that the propriety of 
Originalism lies in its necessity to preserve the democratic 
character of our government. More specifically, its propriety lies 
in the fact that the source of our law's authority rests in the 
consent of the governed-in the fact that the people agreed to 
the law. People possess the "right to be governed only in accord 
with their own consent," Whittington affirms." This is why we 
seek to maintain a government of and by the people. 
When we confront the question of legal interpretation, 
Originalism, Whittington argues. is the method that is uniquely 
consonant with this. For Originalism is the only means of 
applying the law that is faithful to what the people, in enacting 
laws through their representatives. agreed to. Only Originalism 
faithfully honors the people's authority to constitute their 
government insofar as the Originalist method upholds the 
people's expressed will concerning the nature and limits of that 
government.'" Indeed, ''Originalism is not an accidental addition 
to the constitutional framework but a necessary component of 
the Constitution's own vitality. "27 
As Gregory Bassham has put the case. no people can be 
truly sovereign if its agents are free to defy their commands by 
re-interpreting those commands in a way that the people never 
intended.'x Thus, in Whittington's words, ''The fundamental 
basis for the authority of originalism is its capacity to retain a 
space for the popular sovereign. "2" 
Any alternative entirely inverts the proper lines of 
authority. ''[M]ethods that authorize judicial activism in 
disregard of the intentions of the founders implicitly cast the 
Court itself in the role of the sovereign, authorized to remake 
constitutional meaning in accord with some preferred 
24. Many non-Originalists. of course. such as Bruce Ackerman. John Hart Elv. Cass 
Sunstein. Jeffrey Rosen. Adrian Vermeule. and Stephen Breyer. also stress ser~·ice to 
democracy in their theories of proper judicial methodology. 
25. WH!ITI~GTO!". supra note I. at 155. Strictly. Whittington maintains that it is 
not consent but "potential consent" that undergirds our constitution. /d. at 132 passim. 
While the details of that view are essentially immaterial for our purposes. I will comment 
further on it in Section 5. 
26. /d. at 15~55. 
27. /d. at 152. 
28. Gregory Bassham. lr Means Wh{// Thev Said. 62 REV. POL. 589 (2000) 
(reviewing WH!ITI~GTO~. supra note 1 ). 
29. WHIITI:\GTO:\. supra note I. at 154. 
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conception of the political good.""' Properly, however, according 
to Whittington's line of reasoning. once the sovereign has 
spoken (through the adoption of a constitution), it is for 
everyone Uudges included) to respect its will. There would be no 
point in adopting laws if those laws could be changed non-
democratically by officials in government who are to be agents 
of the people. rather than their masters. For judges to alter the 
meaning of language would clearly deny the people's right to be 
self-governed. Originalism, in short, is necessary to give effect to 
the popular wi11.'1 
We can appreciate the Popular Sovereignty Argument even 
more fully, I think, if we step back to view its reasoning from a 
slightly broader perspective. If the Constitution is a text with 
meaning, as we routinely assume, that meaning was placed there 
by its authors. The Constitution is a manmade artifact. 
Consequently, it makes sense to ask what the people who 
created it were trying to do, in making it. If the Constitution 
were simply an object found in nature, questions of its animating 
rationale or the intelligent purposes behind it would not arise. 
Because the Constitution is a deliberate product of particular 
men's thought and action. however-because they wrote this 
Constitution as they did in order to accomplish certain ends-to 
understand the Constitution and to apply it. we must treat their 
meanings as paramount. To follow any standard other than that 
would be to defy the people's authority. It would not respect 
their authorship of this deliberate, intentional product. 
Simply put. since it is not an accident that the Constitution 
is what it is and says what it says, we must not treat it as if it were 
by allowing the meanings of its words to be altered by 
contemporary judges. If we recognize the Constitution as our 
highest legal authority, then we must abide by what it means. 
And what it means is what it was meant to mean. Its original 
meaning must stand unless and until it is altered through 
constitutionally specified procedures. 
IV. THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION DEFENSE OF 
ORIGINALISM 
The other seductive argument for Public Understanding 
Originalism contends that the Originalist interpretive method is 
the naturaL logical corollary of having a written constitution. 
30. !d. at 155. 
31. /d. at 156. 159. 
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Barn_ett an? _Wh_itti?gton bot~ ar9~e that a written ~o~~titution 
requtres ongmahst mterpretatwn. - As Barnett sees It, the fact 
the Constitution was put in writing ... mandates that its meaning 
must remain the same until it is properly changed."33 By 
committing our constitution to written words, we make those 
words our law. By then accepting the Constitution's sovereignty, 
we accept that those words constitute our law. When we face 
questions of properly interpreting and applying the law, 
accordingly, Originalism provides the only faithful path.34 
Part of the reasoning for viewing writtenness as entailing 
Originalism lies in a simple analogy. Barnett contends that 
Originalism is motivated on the same grounds that lead to a sort 
of Originalism in the legal interpretation of contracts.35 When 
disputes arise concerning the enforcement of contracts, we 
routinely rely on the public understanding of the contract's 
words' meanings for the simple reason that this is what the 
parties committed themselves to. (Indeed, this is why virtually all 
contracts require that any later modifications be made in 
writing.3") The same should hold in regard to understanding the 
Constitution, he reasons. The Constitution's writtenness could 
no longer provide its benefits if its words could be interpreted in 
ways that were at odds with their original meanings. 37 
Observe that this reasoning retains some of the flavor of the 
Popular Sovereignty Argument. Insisting that we adhere to the 
public understanding of the time because this is what the people 
agreed to suggests that that agreement is pivotal. The deeper 
and more distinctive dimension of the Written Constitution 
Argument, however, derives from appreciating the deficiencies 
of an unwritten constitution. The British, famously, have no 
written constitution. The British constitution is understood as 
32. /d. at 50 passim: BARNETT. supra note 2. at 96 passim. 
33. BARNETT. supra note 2. at 96. 
34. Barnett cites Madison as holding that we must take the Constitution's meaning 
"from the text itself." '"in the sense attached to it by the people." /d. at 98. 99. 
35. !d. at 100. Barnett does not believe that the Constitution itself is a contract. 
however. 
36. /d. at 103. 106. 
37. In the case of contracts. Barnett explains. having an agreement written down 
offers several benefits. such as providing evidence that the transaction did in fact take 
place: indicating that the contracting parties had the chance to pause and reflect on their 
actions: encouraging the parties to be deliberate and cautious before making agreements: 
informing people of the necessary means of effecting certain results (such as transferring 
title to property or adopting a child). Putting a constitution in writing. Barnett claims. 
performs many of these same functions. !d. at 101. 
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consisting in and expressed through tradition, the ongoing 
establishment of custom. Whittington describes it well: 
Being unwritten, the British constitution consisted of a 
tradition of practice, general understandings, and occasional 
declarations. Theoretically, Parliament was constrained by the 
need for a connection with these ancient customs, but it was 
also engaged in a constant creation of custom since every 
political and legal act became a part of the tradition of 
. -~ practice. 
Whittington also provides an excellent explanation of the 
significant deficiencies of such a system.'" Because every legal 
and government act is folded into the tradition of practice that is 
the constitution, the British constitution could not be 
distinguished from the acts of government. The relationship 
between the constitution and the lawmaking Parliament, for 
instance-in particular, the extent to which lawmakers are 
constrained by the constitution-is, at best, ambiguous. For the 
constitution has no identity that is squarely independent of 
whatever actions government bodies choose to take. The 
government's power and the legality of its exercise of its power 
bleed into one another in a way that allows that power to exceed 
any firm limits. By leaving the constitution unrestrained by 
38. WHITIINGTON. supra note 1. at 50. This conception is reflected in Lord 
Bolingbroke's well-known 1735 definition of a constitution: "By Constitution we mean. 
whenever we speak with propriety and exactness. that assemblage of laws. institutions. 
and customs. derived from certain ftxed principles of reason ... that compose the general 
system, according to which the community hath agreed to be governed." HENRY ST. 
JOHN, VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE, A DISSERTATION UPON PARTIES 108 (1735). as 
quoted in Brad Thompson, The Revolutionary Origins of American Constitutionalism 7 
(paper presented at Conference on Objectivity in the Law. University of Texas at Austin. 
April2008) (emphasis in original). Thomas Paine advocated a contrasting conception: 
"A constitution is not a thing in name only. but in fact. It has not an ideal. but a 
real existence: and wherever it cannot be produced in a visible form. there is 
none. A constitution is a thing antecedent to a government. and a government is 
only the creature of a constitution. The constitution of a country is not the act of 
its government. but of the people constituting a government. ... A constitution. 
therefore. is to a government, what the laws made afterwards by that 
government are to a court of judicature. The court of judicature does not make 
the laws, neither can it alter them: it only acts in conformity to the laws made: 
and the government is in like manner governed by the constitution ... 
THOMAS PAINE. RIGHTS OF MAN 122-23 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1791). quoted in 
Thompson, supra. at 10. While Britain made several significant changes to its 
government's structure and powers in 2005 (including the establishment of a Supreme 
Court and repealing the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords). its constitution 
remains an amalgam of written and unwritten sources. For more on its basic character. 
see BRIAN Z. TAMAN AHA, THE RULE OF LAW 56-58 (2004 ).and for a good discussion of 
contrasting historical conceptions of what a constitution is. see Thompson. supra. 
39. In what follows. I draw heavily from Whittington's discussion in WHITIINGTON. 
supra note 1. at 50-53. 
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specific provisions explicitly articulated in language, in other 
words, the distinction between government activity and legality 
is attenuated, if not erased. Under such a system, the law is not 
an independent check on the activities of government; as a 
consequence, no government activity can be legitimately 
regarded as clearly off-limits, prohibited by the law. There 
simply is no settled, distinct law for our governors to answer to. 
Whittington reports that the Founding Fathers were acutely 
aware of these defects and deliberately adopted a written 
constitution in order to guard against the dangers of the 
unrestrained government that such nebulous legality allows. As 
long as a nation has an unwritten constitution which is in 
continual evolution as each new action of any the government's 
branches reshapes its exact contours, it is impossible to fix what 
the constitution is. Correspondingly, "it" could offer no firm 
protections to citizens' rights. Committing to a written 
constitution, by contrast, with the attendant obligation to uphold 
it or to alter it through its prescribed process of written 
amendment, provides an indispensable check against having a 
law whose perpetual uncertainty makes it impossible to know 
what the government's powers and what an individual citizen's 
liberties are. 
What this contrast with an unwritten constitution makes 
clear is that the Written Constitution Argument for Originalism 
turns, fundamentally, on a recognition of the purpose of 
government. The purpose of government is to protect individual 
rights. 40 The specific purpose of a constitution is derivative: to 
establish and publicly set forth the fundamental character of the 
government that is created to carry out that mission (identifying 
the basic rules and powers by which it will operate). A 
40. This is the Lockean view that the Founders essentially embraced. although the 
documentation of that and the full support of its philosophical validity are subjects for 
another occasion. In conjunction with the Founders' view of the Constitution as limiting 
a government's authority to restrict individual rights. see Barnett's extensive 
documentation. supra note 2. at 32-39. as well as James Madison. writing. for instance. 
that government "is instituted to protect property of every sort" (having written that 
"property" encompasses liberty) and that "This being the end of government, that alone 
is a just government. which impartially secures to every man. whatever is his own, .. 
MADISON. PROPERTY (1792). quored in Timothv Sandefur. Mine and Thine Disrincr: 
Whar Kelo Says Abow Our Parh. 10 CHAP. L. REV I. 7 (2006). and Madison. writing that 
..... the sovereignty of the societv as vested in & exercisable by the majority. may do 
anything that could be righrfullv done by the unanimous concurrence of the members: 
the reserved rights of individuals (of conscience. for example) in becoming parties to the 
original compact being beyond the legitimate reach of sovereignty. whenever vested or 
however viewed." MADISON. SOVEREIGNTY ( 1835). quored in Sandefur. supra, at 6. I 
will discuss the purpose of government further in Part V. 
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constitution cannot serve that purpose, however, if its language 
is pliable. The people set boundaries on the activities of their 
agents by naming the powers transferred to those agents and by 
writing specific rules and limits into law. "The people can 
constrain their governmental agents," however, "only by fixing 
their will in an unchanging text" with unchanging meaning, 
Whittington contends.41 The written text is a symbol of intent, he 
emphasizes.4c That intended meaning is embedded in and 
conveyed through language. If the text of our law is not fixed, 
however, what is it that people are ratifying? In adopting it, what 
are they agreeing tot3 "To give the words of the Constitution 
new meanings over time" would undermine the value of a 
written constitution.44 Thus he concludes that Originalism, 
insofar as it upholds fidelity to the law's original meaning, is the 
only method of constitutional interpretation that is consistent 
with our constitutional project.4' 
While Barnett would resist any implications of popular 
sovereignty that may creep into some of Whittington's statement 
of this argument, he invokes Lysander Spooner to make 
essentially the same case. A century earlier, Spooner had 
written: 
We must admit that the Constitution, of itself, independently 
of the actual intentions of the people, expresses some certain 
fixed, definite, and legal intentions; else the people 
themselves would express no intention by agreeing to it. The 
instrument would, in fact, contain nothing that the people 
could agree to. Agreeing to an instrument that had no 
meaning of its own, would only be agreeing to nothing.46 
Barnett stresses that written constitutions are valuable to 
the extent that they "lock in" an initially legitimate lawmaking 
scheme.47 Yet, he wonders, how can a meaning be preserved and 
the governors truly restrained if the written words are malleable 
and mean only what judges today want them to mean?48 Only if 
government agents "cannot change the scope of their own 
41. WHITTINGTON. supra note 1. at 56. 
42. /d. at 59 passim, 99. 
43. /d. at 55. 
44. /d. at 58. 
45. /d. at 61. 
46. LYSANDER SPOONER, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery. reprinted in 4 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF LYSANDER SPOONER 222 (Charles Shively ed .. 1971) (rev. ed. 
1860). quoted in BARNETT. supra note 2, at 105 (emphasis Barnett's). 
47. BARNETT. supra note 2. at 88. 
48. !d. 
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powers can the rights of the people be in any way assured."~~ 
"Lock -in" is not achieved if the meaning of the writing can be 
changed without formal amendment. But that is what non-
originalist interpretations of legal meaning do. Any interpretive 
method that permits deviation from the words' original meaning 
defeats the point of having a written constitution. Only a fixed 
text can provide the security of individuals' rights which is our 
reason for having a government and constitution in the first 
place. 
While Barnett acknowledges that the meanings of words 
can change over time, he thinks that we must nonetheless honor 
the meanings that words had at the time that relevant laws were 
adopted. For anything other than that would contradict the 
meaning that the adopters expressed and that is our law."' One 
need not believe that popular will is the source of our 
government's authority to believe that if the Constitution is our 
law. it must mean what it meant on adoption. For the 
alternative- substituting different meanings for its various 
provisions- actually rejects the Constitution as the bedrock of 
our legal system. Countenancing such an interpretive method 
would "respect" the Constitution in name only. As Barnett 
summarizes, "constitutional legitimacy depends on what the 
writing says. "'1 
V. CRITIQUE OF THE POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 
DEFENSE 
Straightforward and compelling as it can seem, the popular 
sovereignty defense of Originalism is neither historically nor 
philosophically sound. 
One familiar objection to the thesis of popular sovereignty 
is the charge that the will of the people is a fiction. No such 
popular endorsement of our government has actually been 
given. This mythology conveniently overlooks the leagues of 
people who have been excluded from the ''popular will"- those 
who did not vote in a particular election. for instance, or those 
49. /d. at 117. 
50. /d. at 105-D6. 
51. /d. at 116-17. The Popular Sovereignty and Written Constitution Arguments 
obviously bear affinities. and some of these similarities as well as their differences should 
emerge more clearly as we proceed to critique each. For now. what is most salient in 
distinguishing the two is Barnett's belief that natural rights stand prior to the authoritv of 
anyone"s will. Consequently. he reasons. popular sovereignty cannot be the ultiiTiate 
foundation of government legitimacy. 
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who did, but favored the minority position. Even more damaging 
to its sunny scenario are many groups who were not legally 
permitted to vote at various times. such as blacks, women. or 
those who fell short of property qualifications. In practice, the 
point is, the ""will of the people" at best reflects the will of some 
people, but far from all. Consequently. allegiance to popular 
sovereignty does not provide the safeguard for pure democracy 
that the Originalists claim. 
Whittington forthrightly confronts problems with the actual 
working of popular sovereignty and he develops an elaborate 
notion of '·potential sovereignty" in order to circumvent them.52 
While I have doubts about the success of this attempt to 
differentiate consenting to something and authorizing it and to 
derive actual sovereignty out of possible future decisions, what is 
important here is that fiddling with the mechanics of how 
consent is expressed merely distracts from the central issue. 53 
For even if the consent of the governed were explicitly and 
unanimously granted, it could not provide the authority that the 
Originalists think it does. Neither in fact, nor in the view of the 
Founders, is anyone's say-so by itself the foundation of 
government legitimacy. Government power is the power to 
initiate the use of force against people. As such, its legitimate 
exercise rests on more than some individuals' nods of approval. 
A person's obligation to respect others' rights exists 
independently of his agreeing to respect those rights. 
Consequently. popular will per se-people's agreement-is not 
52. WHITII:-.'GTO'<. supra note 1. at 132 passim. The full character of this potential 
sovereignty is rather complex. but let me quote Whittington at length to try to convey the 
basic idea: 
Unlike tacit consent. ... potential sovereignty does not assume that such 
consent exists at all moments to authorize current government actions. More 
concretelv. it does not assume the existence of present agreement as to the 
content of the sovereign will. Perhaps more clearly. it does not assume the 
existence of a currently active sovereign .... Consensual government does not 
require the imagination of a current consent: rather. it requires that government 
receive authorization for its actions .... The government was set in motion by 
consent. but it need not demonstrate our continuing consent in order to remain 
in motion .... [T]he founders initiated the Constitution. which remains valid 
and binding not by virtue of their right to govern over us but by virtue of the 
"historical accident" that their text is the most recent expression of consent. .. . 
We have not vested [the Constitution] with authority. Rather. it is binding ... in 
that it represents our potential to govern ourselves. 
!d. at 132-33. 
53. It is noteworthy that "potential sovereignty" ultimately seems to rely on tacit 
consent. which Whittington himself emphatically rejects as inadequate to ground 
government authority. 
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the ultimate foundation of the government's authority. Let me 
elaborate. 
A. THE FOUNDERS' PREMISES 
First, consider the views of the Founders. In order to reach 
a rational interpretation of what their written language meant 
and of how it should be applied to later cases, it is mandatory, 
according to the Originalist's principles, to respect their beliefs 
about what they were saying, the premises that informed their 
adoption of these laws. An Originalist must respect the 
intellectual framework in which these men wrote the 
Constitution, since that furnishes the background necessary to 
identify what the original understanding of its specific provisions 
was.
54 What is salient to assessing the Popular Sovereignty 
Argument is the fact that the Founders were not unqualified 
democrats.'' The authors of our constitution were vocal and 
ardent champions of the doctrine that individuals possess natural 
rights. And they understood these rights to limit the domain 
within which the will of the people may rule, since one 
individual's rights pose a boundary beyond which others' will 
may not impinge. Whittington's Popular Sovereignty Argument, 
however, ignores these limitations on the people's sovereignty 
and blithely reads our '"constitutional project" in a way that 
defies them. 
Undoubtedly, the Founding Fathers supported elements of 
democracy in government. Part of the appeal of the Popular 
Sovereignty Argument stems from the fact that our legal system 
does respect the popular will- on certain limited choices. Votes 
determine details concerning how the government will protect 
citizens' rights, the specific mechanisms through which it 
functions (issues of personnel and procedure, for instance, such 
as eligibility requirements for elected office, term limits, and 
voting age). What is crucial, however, is that it is not for the 
people to decide whether to respect rights. The democratic 
54. John Quincy Adams. Abraham Lincoln. and Frederick Douglass are among 
those who have held that the Declaration of Independence should be used to inform our 
understanding of the Constitution. See JAMES A. COLAIACO. supra note 6. at 41-43. 
55. See BARNETT. supra note 2. at 32 passim: EDWARD CORWIN. THE HIGHER 
LAW BACKGROCND OF AMERICAN CONSTITL'TIONAL LAW (1955): SCOTT GERBER. TO 
SECCRE THESE RIGHTS (1995): JEROME HUYLER. LOCKE IN AMERICA: THE MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF THE FOUC\/DING ERA (1995): STEPHEN MACEDO. THE NEW RIGHT V. 
THE CONSTITUTION (1987): PAULINE MAIER. AMERICAN SCRIPTURE (1997): THE 
FRAMERS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (Robert Licht ed .. 1992): BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT. 
AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAW (1962). 
16 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:1 
elements that the Founders accepted are only a portion of a 
broader the9ry of proper government that is fundamentally non-
democratic.'h 
Indeed. the Founders explicitly and repeatedly named the 
dangers of handing the power of government over to 
unvarnished majority rule. James Madison warned in a letter to 
Thomas Jefferson that the real danger of oppression arises "not 
from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its 
constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere 
instrument of the major number of the Constituents. "'7 In 
Federalist No. 10. Madison famously cautioned that the rights of 
the minority are often endangered by a majority animated by a 
common interest or passion. Madison writes that "pure" 
democracies "have ever been spectacles of turbulence and 
contention: have ever been found incompatible with personal 
security, or the rights of property .... "'H 
Madison's view was hardly unusual. Barnett compiles 
numerous statements from a variety of Founders echoing these 
reasons for restraining the power of "the people. '''9 The upshot is 
that the Founders were not so reckless as to replace the rejected 
notion of the divine right of kings with a comparable belief in an 
unlimited right of the masses.60 The most basic source of 
government authority was not, in their view, the will of the 
people, whatever that will may be. Rather, it is individuals' 
inalienable rights, which are held prior to and independent of a 
majority's willingness to respect those rights. While the people's 
consent may be necessary in authorizing certain activities of a 
government, this does not entail that the people's will alone, 
regardless of its content, is our legitimate sovereign. In the 
Founders' view. the purpose of government is to protect 
56. Barnett contends that the Founders conceived of the legislature as designed. 
within an elaborate svstem of checks and balances. to curb the excesses of other rulers. 
rather than as an all-powerful ruler itself. BARNETI. supra note 2. at 37-38. Jack Rakove 
defends a similar view in ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKI~G 
OF THE CONSTITLTIO~ 203--43 ( 1997) 
57. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17. 1788). quoted in 
BARNETI. supra note 2. at 32. Jefferson. in a similar spirit. wrote that ··what is true of 
every member of the society individually. is true of them all collectively. since the rights 
of the whole can be no more than the sum of the rights of individuals."" Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6. 1789). quoted in Sandefur. supra note 40. at 
7 & n.35. 
58. THE FEDERALIST No. 10. at 61 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed .. 1961). 
59. I highly recommend his discussion. See BARNETI. supra note 2. at ch. 2 
(especially pp. 32-35). 
60. /d. at 32. 
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individual rights; it is not to do whatever the people would like it 
to do. Since no one holds the right to initiate force against 
another person, no ballot can deliver that right to a government. 
The mere expression of the desire for such authority, regardless 
of the number who share that desire. does not create it."1 
It was not only in statements about proper government that 
the Founders expressed their rejection of popular sovereignty. 
They also built it into the Constitution itself. most conspicuously 
in the Ninth Amendment and in Article I. which confers the 
powers of the Congress. The Ninth Amendment's invocation of 
rights ''retained by the people" is Constitutional testimony to the 
conviction that rights precede and restrain government. rather 
than the other way around. Indeed. while the Founders did 
consider it important to secure the people's consent for certain 
activities of the government. the very idea that consent 
legitimates certain lawmaking rests on the presumption that 
individuals possess rights. in virtue of which no one may treat 
them in certain ways without their consent. If they were not 
conceived as rightholders. their consent would not be 
"' necessary. 
Equally damning to the thesis of popular sovereignty is the 
Necessary and Proper clause of Article L Section 8. That clause 
states that the Congress shall have power ''to make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution 
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof."'" Notice that this requirement is 
unintelligible without reference to values: "necessary" and 
"proper" relative to what? For what end or purpose? The clause 
itself provides the answer: necessary and proper for executing 
the powers vested by the Constitution. What is important to 
recognize here is that in stating that Congress may take those 
actions that are necessary and proper so as to carry out the 
61. Whittington might try to resist this paragraph's characterization of the Popular 
Sovereignty view. given his belief that an earlier supermajority. by adopting the 
Constitution. imposes limits on the permissibility of certain later actions that deviate 
from the Constitution. Yet because. on his view. it is the assertion of this will (in adopting 
the Constitution) rather than antecedent rights that provides the bedrock foundation for 
laws' authority. my characterization is. logically. the inescapable implication of his view. 
While people might have to go through a few legal hoops to effect their will. in other 
words. what is important is that on his view. nothing ather than will (so long as it is 
expressed through the pre-adopted means) carries the authority to veto the people's will. 
62. BARI'E1T. supra note 2. at 44. 
63. U.S. CO~ST. art. I.§ 8. 
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powers it has been granted, the clause does not grant Congress 
additional powers.64 Bear in mind that Section 1 of Article I vests 
Congress only with legislative powers "herein granted," as 
Barnett stresses, and not with unlimited powers. Madison aptly 
observed that to read Congress as having unlimited powers 
would render "nugatory the enumeration of particular powers.""' 
Indeed, the Constitutional convention rejected a bill that would 
have granted more extensive powers to Congress. hi> 
What. then, are these granted powers for? To enable the 
government to achieve its purpose. The rationale for having a 
government, with its distinctive and extensive powers, logically 
informs our understanding of which more specific powers any of 
its branches may possess. This clause, in other words, directly 
calls for the use of criteria other than the popular will to 
determine the legitimacy of Congressional action. The 
requirement of necessity and propriety would be hollow if 
compliance consisted simply of obedience to whatever "the 
people" may want. If the will of the people were the true master 
of what Congress may do, what is "necessary" and "proper" 
would be as erratic, unpredictable, and unrestrained as the 
whims of public opinion. In truth, this clause virtually invites 
judges to consider the larger purpose of government in order to 
reach decisions about whether certain activities fall within the 
Congress's purview."7 
I do not mean to suggest that Whittington would have 
judges defy the Ninth Amendment or Article I. Insofar as these 
are parts of the Constitution, he believes that a judge is bound to 
64. BAR:\ETI. supra note 2. at 155-56: he also cites several participants at the 
ratifying conventions saying as much. 
65. /d. at 153. 160-62 (including an extended passage from Madison on the meaning 
of the Necessary and Proper clause). The fact that the Necessary and Proper clause was 
widely considered justiciable (open to legal challenge) also indicates that the people of 
the time did not regard it as granting unlimited powers. /d. at 178. 180: see also letter 
from James Madison to Henry Lee (Jan. I. 1792) ( .. If not only the means [of 
government's actions] but the objects are unlimited. the parchment had better be thrown 
into the fire at once ... ). quoted in Sandefur. supra note 40. at 28 n.l57 (emphasis in 
original). 
66. BAR:\ETI. supra note 2. at 155. 
67. Justice Chase embraced this view quite directly in Calder v Bull. 3 U.S. 386 
(Dall.) (1798) ·The purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature 
and terms of the social compact: and as they are the foundations of the legislative power. 
thev will decide what are the proper objects of it. The nature and ends of legislative 
power will limit the exercise of it. .. Further. he writes: .. An act of the legislature (for I 
cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact. cannot be 
considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority:· For a similar view. see 3 STORY. 
supra note 4. * 1393. at 268 (1833). 
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uphold them. Constitutional fidelity may even sometimes 
require the court's overturning popularly mandated legislation 
that violates these yrovisions. Whittington supports the practice 
of judicial review. My point. rather, is that the Constitution's 
inclusion of these provisions makes sense only on the premise of 
individual rights- the premise that the popular sovereignty 
thesis, as advocated by Public Understanding Originalists, 
denies.69 
B. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AS PHILOSOPHICALLY MISGUIDED 
Not only is the doctrine of popular sovereignty at odds with 
the historical facts. It is also philosophically mistaken. Even if 
the Founders had accepted the idea that the popular will is 
sovereign, this thesis could not sustain Originalism because it 
cannot be sustained. The will of the people per se is not, in truth, 
the ultimate source of government authority. While this is 
obviously a large claim whose validation requires a separate 
treatment of seminal issues in political philosophy, it will be 
useful for evaluating the Popular Sovereignty defense of 
Originalism to sketch the basic idea.70 
Consider the basic nature of government- the tremendous 
power that government enjoys to force people to act in various 
ways. Where does that authority (which a legitimate government 
properly possesses) come from? Surely I, as an individual, do not 
possess the authority to compel other people to do as I wish. Nor 
do you. Nor do we, together. Our wanting such an authority 
would not give it to us, even if we expressed that desire through 
an eloquent formal statement. Individuals' wills or agreements 
do not determine the contents of men's rights. 
68. He does so on the grounds that it is an exercise in democracy. WHITIINGTON. 
supra note 1. at 159. 168. 207. Note that while few Originalists would expressly reject 
judicial review all together. the passivity that they sometimes counsel (or practice) may 
amount to as much. Whittington discusses one such type of "judicial passivism." !d. at 
168. 
69. A further clarification: I am not attributing to Originalism the view that we 
must adopt Originalism because the Founders did. While some Originalists might employ 
that argument. Whittington clearly does not. The historical discrepancy that I am 
pointing out lies in the fact that the Popular Sovereignty Argument ignores the 
commitment to individual rights that informs the meaning of the Founders' words. 
70. The view that I adopt is essentially Lockean. For fuller discussion. see 
LEONARD PEIKOFF. OBJECTIYIS~I: THE PHILOSOPHY OF A Y~ RA!><D 363--69 (1991 ): 
AYN RAND. The Nature of Government and Man's Rights. in CAPITALIS~I: THE 
UNKNOWN IDEAL (1967): TARA SMITH. MORAL RIGHTS A"iD POLITICAL FREEDOM 
(1995) (elaborating on the nature and basis of the rights that the government should 
protect). 
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The purpose of government is to protect individuals' rights, 
which is radically different from the purpose of simply enacting 
the people's will. Will becomes significant only as a means of 
respecting rights. As noted above, it is necessary to obtain 
individuals' consent to certain government activities because 
those activities encroach on a domain that rightfully belongs to 
those individuals. To avoid infringing on their rights, 
government must secure their agreement before engaging in 
those activities. People's agreement does not create the 
boundaries of their rights, however. While a person is properly 
free to decide how to exercise those rights that are genuinely his, 
it is not an individual's prerogative to decide what his rights 
themselves are (which would also have the effect of deciding 
what others' rights are. since one person's rights carry 
obligations of respect, for others, and those obligations affect the 
parameters of their rights). 
For the purpose of properly applying the law, the point is 
that authorship does not confer authority. Originalists frequently 
emphasize "the people" as the author of the Constitution in 
order to argue that the people's meaning is what judges must 
respect. It is a fatal error, however, to slide from locating 
allthorship of the Constitution with the will of the people to 
viewing the awhority of the Constitution as constituted by the 
will of the people. Authorship neither creates nor expands one's 
authority. The sheer fact of expressing one's will (through 
authoring the Constitution or anything else) does not bring with 
it the authority to have one's will obeyed. Because authors are 
not entitled to assign themselves any authority that they do not 
antecedently possess, the "will of the people" is binding on 
others only within circumscribed bounds. While it is certainly 
true. as the Popular Sovereignty Argument contends, that the 
people's agents in various branches of government would be 
wrong to defy the people's wishes, the domain of the rightful 
exercise of the people's wishes is limited. Agents have no 
warrant to exceed those limits. Agents must be faithful to their 
masters' will, in other words, strictly within the legitimate scope 
of that will. "I 
While agency is a perfectly valid relationship that does 
restrain the actions of the agents, then, we must not lapse into 
71. Whittington's previously cited belief in "the people's right to be governed only 
in accord with their own consent" is valid. correspondingly. only insofar as it refers to the 
people's consent within the scope of their rightful authority. WHITIINGTON. supra note 
I. at 155. 
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assuming that it requires a government's deference to the 
unqualified will of the people. No one may transfer to agents any 
authority that he does not himself possess." If the government's 
agency were taken to require submissive implementation of 
whatever a majority wants, it would stand at loggerheads with a 
commitment to individual rights. If "the people" have final say 
over what the government may do, then the people have a right 
to infringe on individuals' rights-a contradiction in terms. A 
right that others may violate is not a genuine right. Rights are 
moral claims that a person is entitled to assert independently of 
anyone else's approval. They are possessed in virtue of facts 
about him (facts about his nature, qua human being), rather than 
in virtue of others' attitudes toward him. That is the concept's 
point. To say that a person has a right to something is to say that 
he has the final word on whether and how it is to be used or 
done; it is a matter under his moral jurisdiction.73 The doctrine of 
popular sovereignty, however, represents a frontal assault on this 
by effectively denying anyone's possession of rights. By positing 
that the wishes of the many may cancel the wishes of the 
individual, it denies that the rightholder's will is ever supreme. 
For even as long as a "rightholder" does happen to enjoy the 
ability to rule a particular issue, he does so only thanks to the 
indulgence of a majority, who may revoke it at any time. This is 
a permission, rather than a right. 
72. John Locke. for one. was quite explicit about this. See JOHN LOCKE. SECOND 
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT§ 23. at 17. § 135. at 70 (C. B. Macpherson ed .. 1980) (1690). 
73. I say .. moral .. to distinguish this from legal jurisdiction. While the two often 
coincide. thev do not necessarilv. since a nation ·s laws do not alwavs correctlv reflect a 
person·s mo;al jurisdiction. Bla-ck people"s moral authority to rule. their own lives. for 
example. was for many years not properly recognized in our legal system. One should not 
conclude. however. that morality approves of any or every of a person ·s uses of his rights. 
What is right for a person to do is a distinct question from what he has a right to do. even 
though both fall under morality"s authority. Rights govern what a person should be free 
to do (i.e .. free from the coercive interference of others). The overall rightness of a 
person·s action. in contrast. concerns what a person should do. the propriety of a person·s 
choices even within his rightful jurisdiction. For further clarification. see S~IITH. supra 
note 70. at ch. 1 (especially pp. 21-21). For a similar description of rights as governing 
individuals" domains of authority rather than actions· overall moral propriety. see H.L.A. 
Hart. Are There Anr Natural Rights?. in RIGHTS. 16. 24 (David Lyons. ed .. 1979). And 
on the distinctive. decisive strength of rights. see Ronald Dworkin"s (who famouslv 
referred to rights as trumps) Taking Rights Seriouslr. in TAKI!'OG RIGHTS SERIOUSLy 
184-205 (1978): JOEL FEINBERG. The Nature and Va-lue of Rights. in RIGHTS. JtJSTICE. 
AND THE BOCNDS OF LIBERTY. 143-55 (1980): PEIKOFF. supra note 70. at 351-63: 
RA"'D. supra note 70. at 321-23: SMITH. supra note 70. at 16-21. 
22 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:1 
C. OBJECTION: ASTRA W MAN? 
All of this notwithstanding, some might object that I have 
overstated the doctrine of popular sovereignty and thereby 
attacked a straw man, failing to refute the salient portion of the 
Originalist's argument. For even if I am right in rejecting an 
unqualified form of popular sovereignty that prescribes 
unconditional deference to the will of the people, since no 
constitution can enact itself, surely some degree of popular 
sovereignty must be true. It is people who authorize a particular 
constitution, after all. And if a more moderate thesis of popular 
sovereignty stands up, why isn't that enough for the Originalist's 
argument to succeed? 
In fact, however, advocates of the Popular Sovereignty 
Argument do not embrace a "moderate," qualified commitment 
to popular sovereignty. Rather, they treat consent as an all-
powerful wild card capable of extinguishing individual rights. 
What is important is not only what the Public Understanding 
Originalists think of themselves as doing or would like to be 
doing, but the logical implications of the reasoning for their 
position. Bear in mind that in the Originalist view, in order to 
determine law's meaning, we are to look exclusively to how the 
law's pivotal words were used by a certain group. If we 
encounter a conflict between what a word means and what the 
public at time t thought it meant, the latter is decisive. As 
Barnett posits. "If the public at the time of ratification 
understood the term 'commerce' in the Constitution to include 
trade, exchange, and navigation, then that is its original 
meaning."74 Nothing more needs to be considered.7' Whittington 
likewise holds that written and enacted legal provisions are 
meaningless unless the Founders could reach a common 
understanding of their meaning.76 In fact, while it is true that the 
absence of agreement about meaning could be a sign of a law's 
employment of invalid and objectively meaningless concepts, it 
is not proof of it. To treat it as if it is, as Whittington and Barnett 
both do, is to substitute a group's subjective beliefs about 
meaning for objective meaning. (This distinction should become 
clearer later in the paper.) 
74. BARNETT. supra note 2. at 293. 
75. It is noteworthY that while Barnett seeks to distance his position from the 
popular sovereignty rationale for Originalism. the way that he here construes the 
meaning of language reveals that he is relying on what amounts to it. I will return to 
make this clearer later in the paper. 
76. WHITTINGTON. supra note 1. at 96. 
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The basis for reading the doctrine of popular sovereignty 
employed in the Originalisfs argument as unqualified, therefore, 
is that when it is used as a defense of this particular brand of 
Originalism, it grants the public of a given time the power to 
dictate what words mean. Such a power is unlimited. It is 
incapable of being limited, since on such a view, the public 
would equally dictate the meanings of any words that might be 
intended to express limitations on that power. I am not 
contemplating a case in which later people deliberately alter the 
meanings enacted by earlier people, of course; that is 
(reasonably) what Originalists seek to avoid. The problem is that 
the belief that words stand for simply what people choose 
(rather than for external referents of definite sorts) rests on the 
premise that words have no objective meaning. If that were the 
case, however-if meaning were nothing but what group A 
thinks and what group B thinks and what group C thinks-
linguistic expression would be incapable of reining in anyone's 
power. If "the people'' get to declare what words mean, they can 
"authorize" only as much respect for anyone's rights as they 
choose and thus erase all limits on the rule of their will. When 
language lacks objective meaning, in other words, it lacks the 
power to serve as a firm check on the exercise of that will. This is 
hardly a "moderate" form of popular sovereignty. 
To put the point slightly differently: Originalist advocates of 
the Popular Sovereignty Argument are not simply saying that 
the will of the people is necessary for government authority. 
They are claiming that it is sufficient. This is apparent from the 
conclusion that they draw: that what the will of the people was at 
a certain time-its content, as expressed in the enacted law-is 
sufficient ground for concluding that that is what must be 
obeyed: their words as they understood them, no more and no 
less. No further check on "their" meaning is required. To equate 
that with the law that contemporary judges must uphold, 
however, is to treat the people's will as sovereign-
unconditionally.77 
77. Notice that when we speak of the understanding of words· meaning of the 
people of a particular time. this could be taken to refer either to the actual lists of 
referents of specific words that these people would have supplied or to the criteria that 
they would have employed for determining the referents to which the word applied. The 
first would be. for example. a list of types of speech that people in 1787 thought that the 
First Amendment encompassed. such as written letters or newspaper articles. but not 
speech conveyed via radio or telephones or email (since those did not yet exist). The 
criteria that they would have employed for determining referents. by contrast. would 
allow for latter-day additions to the legitimate referents of free speech that were not 
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The problem with the Popular Sovereignty Argument, then. 
does not arise from the simple claim that the people are 
sovereign in our system. In one significant sense, they are. The 
government does derive its just powers from the consent of the 
governed, as the Declaration of Independence proclaims. It is 
crucial to understand precisely what this does and does not 
signify. however. While a government may, legitimately, compel 
a person even against his will to respect others' rights, it may not 
compel him to do anything else against his will. Any government 
action that would. absent the individual's consent, infringe on his 
rights, requires his consent. 7~ Correspondingly, the "people's 
authority" is only as extensive as the rights of those people. 
When popular sovereignty is invoked as a basis for Public 
Understanding Originalism, however. the only "degree" of 
popular sovereignty that could conceivably justify its sweeping 
conclusion is the unqualified degree. A "moderate" popular 
sovereignty constrained by respect for individuals' rights is too 
meager to warrant the conclusion that the meaning of the law is 
dictated by the wishes of the people. Only a much more 
muscular popular sovereignty could support the notion that the 
words of a law represent simply what they were taken to refer to 
by particular men in a particular era. Accordingly. that is the 
form of popular sovereignty that I have criticized as both 
historically and philosophically unfounded. 
Much of the appeal of the Popular Sovereignty Argument, I 
think. trades on the fact that the people ·s consent does play an 
important role in our political system: consent is necessary for 
the government's authority to treat people in ways that would 
otherwise be violations of their rights. Yet the argument neglects 
what is crucial: the fact that consent is necessary does not mean 
that it is sufficient to justify whatever the people agree to. That is 
how Public Understanding Originalism treats it. however. To 
yield to those who enact a law the power to create words' 
meanings-to freeze the law's meaning to match only their 
conceived of in 1787. such as phone and email communication. Throughout. I shall adopt 
the more plausible reading of the Originalist view and take it to refer to not only the 
finite lists of particulars that the people of a certain era would have drawn up. but to the 
criteria that they would have employed for determining inclusion on such lists. The 
criticisms I press are equally effective against this stronger ... criteria .. view. For more on 
this distinction and on the failings of both versions. see Smith. supra note 2. 
78. Once a government is established. it must adopt specific means of fulfilling its 
function. of course. and it does not require an individual's consent to every one of those. 
All of the government's actions. however. must fall within the range of the powers that 
the government has been granted. 
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fallible, incomplete and quite possibly misinformed beliefs about 
the phenomena named in a law-is. in its effect, to make the 
people all-powerful, individual rights be damned. It no longer 
matters what the law says: what rules is what certain people 
thought it says. 
A full discussion of the proper domain of popular 
sovereignty is, again, the subject for a separate, larger discussion. 
What is immediately significant is that a popular sovereignty 
rationale for Originalism abandons the commitment to natural 
rights. We cannot simultaneously respect the "will of the people" 
as ultimate sovereign and the will of the person, the singular 
rightholder. If the former enjoys final authority. individual rights 
are eradicated. 
VI. CRITIQUE OF THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 
DEFENSE 
The other argument to be reckoned with grounds 
Originalism in the logic of having a written constitution. The 
motivation behind this argument is eminently reasonable: to 
guard against a bait and switch whereby the people enact one 
law but, due to manipulative "interpretation." something else is 
applied by the courts. While such interpretation would be an 
injustice, we shall see that Originalism is not the right way to 
combat it. In fact, its employment results in essentially the same 
thing (albeit, without deliberate trickery). 
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO ARGUMENTS 
Before examining the Written Constitution Argument itself, 
we should clarify the relationship between the two defenses of 
Originalism so as to forestall a possible objection to Barnett's 
adoption of it. Some advocates of the Popular Sovereignty 
Argument may view the Written Constitution Argument as its 
completion. For if the will of the people is the sole basis of 
government authority. then it is imperative that the people 
express their will by putting it into words. The government has 
no authority apart from what the people bestow on it and the 
people confer that authority by writing the Constitution. The 
written words acquire their paramount significance, therefore, as 
the only means we have of knowing what the people's will is. 
The text is the vehicle by which the only genuine source of 
government authority sets forth exactly how far that authority 
extends. 
26 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:1 
Building on this perspective, one might suppose that, 
because Barnett has rejected popular sovereignty, he cannot 
defend Originalism through the Written Constitution Argument. 
For popular sovereignty may seem to serve as a crucial 
foundation for that argument. Writtenness per se, after all, does 
not obligate. The sheer fact that I want something does not 
entitle me to it. Correspondingly, the sheer fact that a person 
expresses certain wishes in writing does not entail his authority 
to obligate others to comply with his wishes (as I myself have 
just argued). An expression of a man's will is authoritative only 
if that will is antecedently authoritative. In the Written 
Constitution Argument, then, one might surmise a 
presupposition that popular sovereignty is what lends the written 
document its clout: if the people's will is paramount, then the 
written expression of their will must be respected. It is the fact of 
the people's authority, in other words, coupled with the fact that 
they have said how they wish to be governed (by writing the 
Constitution) that compels respect for original meaning. Without 
the popular sovereignty premise, however, the Written 
Constitution Argument loses its footing. 
In fact, Barnett is not in quite the tight corner that this 
suggests. While it is true that the expression of a person's will 
should be respected as authoritative only if that person possesses 
the relevant authority, the objection assumes that the only 
possible source of legal authority is popular sovereignty. In fact, 
it is not. Barnett believes that natural individual rights are the 
foundation of political authority- rights that may be exercised in 
ways that thwart the wishes of others. He believes in individual 
sovereignty, we might say, bounded by the parameters of others' 
like rights.79 On the popular sovereignty view, by contrast, the 
people's will creates all government authority; no other basis for 
this authority exists. Thus an advocate of popular sovereignty 
might well think that the popular sovereignty claim is necessary 
to undergird the Written Constitution Argument, since he views 
the popular will as the only place that government authority 
could originate. If one acknowledges alternative sources of this 
authority, however, the popular sovereignty prop is no longer 
necessary. 
79. Barnett elaborates on this further in RANDY E. BARNETT. THE STRUCTURE OF 
LIBERTY (1998). I discuss the boundaries of individuals' rights and the content of these 
domains in SMITH. supra note 70. especially chapters 6--8. 
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Barnett's argument. accordingly. runs roughly thus: While 
the ultimate foundation of political authority rests in certain 
moral principles that hold prior to a law's being written. for a 
legal system to rely on the direct invocation of these principles 
would leave the law unnecessarily and unfairly mysterious. This 
is why we need laws, clearly articulated and objectively laid out 
for all to know. Once laws are written. we must abide by their 
original meaning, since that reflects what the enacted rules are. 
Regardless of one's view of the ultimate source of legal 
authority, the rules that that authority imposes must be 
expressed in order for anyone to know how to respect them. For 
judges to second-guess these rules and replace them with others 
would fail to respect the laws' authority. If objective knowability 
to all is part of what we reasonably seek in laws and if this public 
accessibility is what writtenness makes possible, then we must 
respect the laws as written-which means. by Barnett's lights, as 
originally understood. (If some people disagree with the content 
of a particular law's original meaning, the Constitution provides 
means of changing that law. Those are the only means, however, 
of legitimately deviating from the original meaning.) For 
Barnett, what underwrites the obligation to respect the written 
law is the fact that that law expresses rules that are within the 
authors' rightful domain. As long as the laws' authors are 
articulating rights and powers that they are entitled to control, 
their words are all-important. 
The rejection of popular sovereignty need not doom the 
Written Constitution Argument, then. In fact, the appeal of 
Barnett to many, I think, lies in the fact that he endorses 
Originalism without positivism. That is, those who accept the 
Popular Sovereignty Argument believe that the law's authority is 
manmade, subject to no further moral conditions. A given law's 
validity turns completely on whether it was enacted according to 
procedures specified by the people: it is based on its pedigree 
rather than its content. Barnett, in contrast, by recognizing 
natural rights, asserts the significance of moral conditions that 
are independent of the will of the people. His attempt to marry 
this commitment to rights with fidelity to the original meaning of 
the written law may seem just what has long been absent from 
the debate over proper interpretation.x" Unfortunately, however, 
80. Dworkin's theory of constitutional interpretation incorporates moral principles 
but is not particularly originalist. See RONALD DWORKIN. LAW'S EMPIRE (1986): 
RONALD DWORKIN. JL'STICE I" ROBES (2006) (hereinafter. DWORKIN. JUSTICE]: 
Dworkin. supra note 8. 
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the Written Constitution Argument involves the same 
subjectivism that infects positivism. 
B. THE 0BJECfiVE MEANING OF THE LAW 
Recall the central contention of the Written Constitution 
Argument: the law is an expression of intent. Since a document 
only has meaning because somebody puts it there, in order to 
understand its meaning, it makes sense to respect what was put 
there. Both Whittington and Barnett observe that only a fixed 
text can be ratified into law. Meaning cannot be preserved and 
the governors cannot be restrained if the written words are 
malleable. "The fact that the Constitution was put in writing," 
Barnett maintains, "mandates that its meaning must remain the 
same until it is properly changed-or candidly rejected."s' 
While the spirit of this is right, writtenness does not imply 
what the Originalist thinks it does. It does imply that the law is 
objective and that the language in which the law is expressed is 
crucial to discovering its objective meaning. The written 
character of our Constitution entails Originalism, however, only 
on a distorted view of why writtenness matters-more 
specifically, on an erroneous conception of what objective 
meaning is. For what is pivotal is what a word's meaning's 
"remaining the same" or being "fixed" consists in. The real issue 
is not originalness, but objectivity. 
The basic truth that Originalism fails to appreciate is that 
the language of the law, like all language (apart from proper 
names), is conceptual. This will require a modest excursion into 
the basic nature of concepts. What follows is only a rough 
sketch. 
Words (other than proper names) stand for concepts. 
Concepts are objective.sc A word does not represent merely the 
subjective experience of a particular speaker. Words do not 
designate a given person's finite collection of actual perceptual 
encounters with, or thoughts concerning, things of a certain kind. 
"Cats," for instance, does not refer only to my beliefs about cats. 
Rather, words refer to things of distinct types. "Cats" stands for 
81. BARNETI. supra note 2. at 96. 
82. While philosophers have sometimes distinguished finer types and .. strengths .. of 
objectivity (such as metaphysical. semantic. etc.). I will not need to explore these here to 
make my basic point. For discussion of some of these finer distinctions. see MA TIHEW 
KRAMER. OBJECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF LAW (2007): Brian Leiter. Objectivity, 
Morality and Adjudication. in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS. 66-98 (Brian Leiter 
ed .. 2001). 
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cats, those animals in the alley that purr. (Truly, a word is simply 
a visual-auditory symbol for a concept and it is concepts that 
refer to things. Thus I will speak primarily of concepts.) 
As Ayn Rand explains, ''A concept is a mental integration 
of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing 
characteristic( s ). with their particular measurements omitted."'~ 
When a person forms a concept, he is mentally grouping 
together distinct existents as one on the basis of certain 
characteristics that distinguish them from other distinct existents. 
(By "existent," I mean anything that exists, be it a material 
object, a properD', relationship, action, process, state of 
consciousness, etc. The watch on my wrist, my being the sister 
of Maria, my writing this paper and my aging are all existents 
insofar as each is so. My being 5'9" or the king of France or 
writing Chess for Dummies are not existents. If I harbor 
delusions to the contrary, those beliefs would be existents. We 
would call them delusions, however, to indicate that the objects 
of these beliefs are not existents {since I am not actually 5'9'', the 
King of France, or the author of Chess for Dummies)).'' A 
"unit." in turn, "is an existent regarded as a separate member of 
a group of two or more similar members."'" And a definition is 
•·a statement that identifies the nature of the units subsumed 
under a concept. "'7 It "designates the essential distinguishing 
characteristic(s) and genus" of those units "according to all the 
relevant knowledge available at that stage of mankind's 
development,""" and thereby serves ''to keep a concept distinct 
from all others. to keep it connected to a specific group of 
existents.··"~ 
R3. A YN RAI"D. INTRODUCTJO]\; TO 0BJECTI\'IST EPISTE\10LOGY 13 (Leonard 
Peikoff and Harry Binswanger eds .. 2d ed. 1990). 
R4. See !d. at 5-7: PEIKOFF. supra note 70. at 4-5. "Existence" refers to everything 
that exists. the totality: "existent" refers to any specific thing that can be isolated from 
other things as a matter of discrete awareness. 
85. My aging is obviously not perceptually observable within a single instant. but 
the process is an object of awareness. mediated by knowledge of other phenomena such 
as change. decay. and death as well as by perceptual evidence of these other phenomena 
(e.g .. my wrinkled skin. grey hairs. greater tendency to fatigue). 
R6. RA"'D. supra note R3. at 6. 
R7. /d. at 40. 
8R /d. at 46 (emphasis in original). 
R9. Leonard Peikoff. The Analyric-Synrheric Dichoromy ( 1967). reprinred in RAND. 
ll"TRODlJCTION TO 0BJECTI\'IST EPISTEMOLOGY 103 (Leonard Peikoff & Harrv 
Binswanger eds .. 2d ed. 1990) (emphasis in original). For a thorough discussion of 
definitions. see Rand's chapter devoted to them: RAND. supra note 83. at 40--54. For an 
account of meaning that is similar in some important respects (though by no means all). 
see Michael S. Moore. A Narural Law Theory of lnrerprerarion 58 S. CAL. L. RE\'. 277-
391\ (1985) [hereinafter Moore. Narural Law]: Michael S. Moore. Semanrics. Meraphnics. 
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All concept-formation is comparative. It is based on the 
observation: "compared to those things, these are the same." 
Units' individual measurements are '"omitted," as Rand says, so 
as to allow us to treat the distinct things (each of which continues 
to exist, of course, in its own measurable particularity) as one. 
The omission is a deliberately selective attention to certain of 
the existents' features, and not others, for the purpose of 
noticing their comparative similarity. It does not involve any 
denial of each unit's actual measurements. (Each cat has 
countless characteristics, for instance. although we focus on only 
some of these when setting it off as a cat.) 
The crucial aspect of concepts' objectivity that the Written 
Constitution Argument misses is the fact that concepts are open-
ended. That is. a concept's referents-the actual instances of that 
concept, the units that the concept integrates-are not a static set 
determined by the experience or knowledge of a particular 
speaker (or set of speakers). The referents are the totality of 
existents of the kind in question, those that users of the concept 
have already identified as such as well as those they have not. 
While you and I both no doubt understand the familiar concepts 
of "books" and "health,'' for example, the words do not refer 
only to the books or healthy specimens that either of us has 
actually experienced or contemplated. Rather, a concept "stands 
for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind. "90 
Whatever possesses the distinguishing features for being a thing 
of a certain sort is a thing of that sort and is encompassed by the 
concept. Yl 
and Objectivity in the Law. paper presented at Conference on Objectivity in the Law. 
University of Texas at Austin. April 4-5. 2008. [hereinafter. Moore. Semantics] 
(especially pp. 8-9). as well as a critique of Moore's position: Onkar Ghate. Comments 
on Michael Moore's "Semantics, Metaphysics, and Objectivity in the Law." presented at 
Conference on Objectivity in the Law. University of Texas at Austin. April4-5. 2008. 
90. RAND. supra note 83. at 10. See also id. at 27-28. 65---{)9. 147. 257-258: PEIKOFF. 
supra note 70. at 78. 103-05: Peikoff. supra note 89. at 98-100: Allan Gotthelf. Ayn Rand 
on Concepts, Definitions, and Objectivity. paper presented at Conference on Concepts 
and Objectivity. University of Pittsburgh. Sept. 2006. 
91. The units that are integrated under a concept reflect both a conceptual common 
denominator and particular distinguishing characteristics within that conceptual common 
denominator. The units of the concept "table ... for instance. share the conceptual 
common denominator of shape with material objects that are not tables (chairs. cats. 
pens. fingers. roses. etc.). but share among themselves the distinguishing characteristic of 
having the particular shape of a level surface suspended by supports. RAND. supra note 
83. at 12. It is in virtue of the broader commensurable characteristic of shape that that we 
can contrast tables· shapes with the shapes of other material objects. Rand defines the 
conceptual common denominator as "the characteristics(s) reducible to a unit of 
measurement. bv means of which man differentiates two or more existents from other 
existents posse~sing it." The distinguishing characteristic of a concept. in turn. 
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To grasp a concept is to grasp that certain things are of a 
kind. Accordingly, it involves adopting a p~licy of subsu~in~ 
under that concept any and every future obJect of that kmd. -
Rand explains with an analogy: 
A concept is not formed by observing every concrete 
subsumed under it, and does not specify the number of such 
concretes. A concept is like an arithmetical sequence of 
specifically defined units, going off in both directions, open at 
both ends and including all units of that particular kind. For 
instance, the concept "man" includes all men who live at 
present, who have ever lived or will ever live. An arithmetical 
sequence extends into infinity, without implying that infinity 
actually exists; such extension means only that whatever 
number of units does exist, it is to be included in the same 
sequence. The same principle applies to concepts: the concept 
'man' does not (and need not) specify what number of men 
will ultimately have existed- it specifies only the 
characteristics of man. and means that any number of entities 
possessing these characteristics is to be identified as 'men. '9' 
The term "open-ended" is, admittedly, potentially 
misleading such that we can appreciate why an Originalist might 
be wary of it. The term could be thought to suggest that meaning 
is unspecified and therefore pliable. But that is not what Rand 
has in mind, as her reference to units being "specifically defined" 
should make clear. Any distinctive kind has a specific identity, 
which is named in its definition. This is what preserves 
objectivity in the application of concepts. 
To appreciate the sense in which concepts are open-ended, 
consider an analogy. If I asked you for a particular arithmetic 
sequence such as ''multiples of four" or "positive prime 
numbers,·· while the number of possible correct answers is open-
ended in the sense that it is infinite. it is not the case that any 
answer that you supplied would be correct. The answer must be 
of the right kind-of the designated kind-in order to belong on 
the list of such numbers. The same holds for concepts: they are 
open-ended in the number of their referents, but not in their 
kind. Open-endedness. in other words, does not entail 
subjectivism. 
"represents a specified category of measurement within the ·conceptual Common 
Denominator' involved." /d. at 15. See also id. at 41. 
92. /d. at 257. 
93. !d. at 17-18 (emphasis in original). 
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What is most significant for our concerns is that it is this 
open-ended quality that enables concepts to refer to things in 
reality rather than simply to the inventory of particular persons· 
minds concerning those things. It reflects the fact that concepts 
refer to things "out there," as we sometimes put it-to actual 
existents in the world around us, rather than to things "in here,'" 
in our heads.94 As Moore puts it, "Meaning is as rich as the 
nature of the things referred to" (and not, I would add, only as 
rich as given individuals' conceptions of those things).95 This 
open-endedness, in turn, allows communication between 
individuals who naturally have had different experiences."" 
Although the exact set of cats that you have encountered is no 
doubt different from the set that I have encountered, when one 
of us speaks of "cats," we both know what that means because 
the word designates anything that is of that kind. As long as you 
know the kind. you know what I am talking about when I say 
that "cats are finicky" or "cats like milk" or "cats are ugly." You 
may well protest that last claim precisely because you 
understand (at least implicitly) that my statement refers not only 
to those cats that I have encountered, but to cats as such. 
Further, because a concept refers to existents, it includes all the 
characteristics of the units integrated, not only those 
characteristics that distinguish things of one kind from things of 
other kinds. 97 All of a thing's characteristics are real, after all 
(those that distinguish cats from dogs as well as those that do 
not, such as tails, teeth, and paws). Existents are nonetheless 
classified as they are because some of their characteristics 
distinguish them from things of other kinds. (Strictly, since every 
existent is unique, we should say that some of their 
characteristics distinguish them more dramatically from other 
things, along a certain axis of measurement {the relevant 
conceptual common denominator, such as shape in the case of 
"tables" or animal in the case of "man").)98 
94. A full account would contrast the objective with the intrinsic as well as with the 
subjective. For Rand's introduction of this trichotomy. see RAND. supra note 70. at 21-
22: see also PEIKOFF. supra note 70. at 142-50: RAND. supra note 83. at 52-54: Ayn Rand. 
Who is the Final Authority in Ethics?. in THE VOICE OF REASON 17-22 (Leonard Peikoff. 
ed .. 1989). 
95. Moore. Semantics. supra note 89. In the same vein. he writes that meaning 
depends on how the world is constituted. Moore. Natural Law, supra note 89. at 337. 
96. This is not to suggest that communication is language's only service. I would 
argue that the function of concepts is primarily cognitive. See RAND. supra note 83. at 69. 
~ 97. /d. at 27. 65-69. 257-58: PEIKOFF. supra note 70. at 102-03: Peikoff. supra note 
89. at 98-100. 
98. See sources cited supra note 90. 
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To be clear, then: the objectivity of concepts rests in the fact 
that concepts refer to existents rather than to anyone's beliefs 
about existents. Concepts are about things-physical objects, 
properties, processes. events. relationships, etc.-rather than 
about anyone's states of consciousness concerning those things."" 
Bear in mind that much of the purpose of the concept of 
objectivity is to discriminate between two kinds of claims that 
human beings make: those that are to be taken as reporting facts 
and those that are not. The concept of objectivity is based on the 
recognition that people's thoughts about existents are not 
necessarily correct and do not dictate the characteristics of those 
existents. Speaking very roughly, we consider a claim objective 
when we think that it really is about reality, that it accurately 
reports a fact. What is objective is based on the way things really 
II XI 
are. 
Open-endedness, then. is an essential feature of objectivity. 
It consists in the fact that. because concepts refer to things in 
reality- to existents of specific kinds- concepts do not refer 
only to those existents that a person has himself encountered or 
imagined (or, that other people to date have encountered or 
imagined) or to only those characteristics that he is aware of or 
considers important. Rather. concepts refer to all things of the 
99. My formulations throughout this paragraph are a bit loose. intended primarily 
to highlight those features of objectivity that are most germane to the immediate 
discussion. A fuller account of objectivity would clarify the relationships among the 
features that I am discussing here. Notice. for instance. that while concepts can certainly 
name distinct mental phenomena such as beliefs. emotions. memories. hopes. and so on. 
my point here is to emphasize the contrast between a belief about x or an attitude toward 
x and x itself. The crucial contrast is between the idea of x (such as mv memorv of mv 
grandparents• apartment) and the object of that idea (the actual ap-artment at 1000 
Hudson Street). Similarly. a person·s fear of heights is distinct from his beliefs about his 
fear of heights (beliefs about its sources. significance. or consequences. for instance). 
100. I couch these claims in the qualifiers .. we consider .. and .. we think:· rather than 
state them directly in terms of what is actuallv so. in order to reflect human fallibilitv. 
That is. despite ~ommon ways of speaking. of facls as objective (or not). strictly. 
objectivity pertains to human beings· method of reaching conclusions. Objectivity is the 
deliberate. self-conscious effort. through the conscientious use of logic. to have one·s 
beliefs conform to reality. See PEIKOFF. supra note 70. at 116 passim. The fact that a 
person who scrupulously adheres to the objective method may nonetheless reach an 
incorrect conclusion does not reveal his procedure to have been non-objective. 
Objectivity is not a guarantee of accuracy. Thus. to put it slightly more carefully. we 
consider a claim objective when we think that adherence to objective procedures gives us 
compelling reason to think that the claim accurately reports a fact. For more on this 
aspect of objectivity. see Tara Smith . .. Social" Objeclivitv and !he Objeclivily of Value. in 
SCIENCE. VALUES. AND OBJECTIVITY 143-71 (Peter Machamer & Gereon Walters eds .. 
2004): Tara Smith. The lmpor!ance of !he Subjecl in ObjeC!h·e Moralily: Dislinguishing 
Objeclive from lmrinsic Value. 25 Soc. PHIL. & POL ·y 126. 126-48 (2008) [hereinafter 
Smith. Objeclive Mora/in·]. 
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relevant kind and to all of those things' actual characteristics, 
including those still to be discovered. 1111 (For purposes of 
classifying this animal in my lap as a cat, for instance, it is 
important to focus on certain of the entity's characteristics and 
not others. but to acknowledge the concept's open-endedness is. 
in part, to remind oneself that every cat-each unit of the 
concept "cat"- is all that it is, encompassing those features that 
set it off as a cat as well as those features that do not.) 1112 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE LAW 
The lesson for legal interpretation from all of this is as 
follows. I would readily agree that the fact that our constitution 
is written. as well as what is written, must constrain 
contemporary judges. Given the objective character of concepts, 
however, we must interpret the written law accordingly. The 
point of writing law is to make the law knowable to all. That 
purpose could not be achieved if the written words were 
understood subjectively, as, in effect. a private code that referred 
only to the contents of particular individuals' heads. Linguistic 
communication presupposes the objectivity and correlative 
open-endedness of concepts (the concepts that are represented 
by our words). To use language is to rely on the fact that words 
stand for existents, rather than for a given speaker's beliefs 
about existents. Language is not an exercise in autobiography; a 
given individual's present personal storehouse of examples of a 
concept does not exhaust the reference of that concept. (Nor 
does the storehouse of a group of people, whether in 1787, 2015, 
or at any other time.) People's understandings of words' 
meanings naturally play a role in their writing laws, but those 
understandings are a means to say something about the kinds of 
actions that will and will not be legally permitted; they are not 
the subject of laws. The method of Originalism, however, treats 
them as if they were. For it makes the contents of people's 
beliefs determinative of the meaning of the law. It replaces 
101. See RA:-;o. supra note 83. at 66. The denial of this would render the subject 
matter of concepts the state of a person's beliefs about the phenomenon referred to 
rather than the phenomenon itself. See also Moore. Semantics. supra note 89. at 13 
(writing that speakers of a language do not ordinarily understand either their exemplars 
or their definitions of a concept '"to fix what is in the extension of the word.'"). 
102. For further elaboration on kev elements of Rand's theory of concepts and 
objective meaning. see Gregory Salmieri. '"Justification as an Aspect of 
Conceptuali::ation: How Rand's Theory of Concepts Represents a 'New Approach to 
Epistemology .... paper presented at Workshop on Normativity and Justification in 
Epistemology and Ethics. Harvey Mudd College. Claremont. CA. June 2007. 
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objective criteria of meaning with the criteria of particular men's 
thoughts about the referents of their words. (Obviously, it is 
human beings who assign the words that stand for various 
concepts: we decide that cats will be designated by the letter 
string "c-a-t." law will be designated "1-a-w,'' and so on for every 
concept that we form. Yet in doing so, we are correlating words 
with kinds of existents, rather than with contents of minds. The 
focus is on those distinctive phenomena in reality that are being 
conceptualized.) 
Notice that in applying the law, we do not employ subjective 
criteria of meaning. Laws do not govern only those people who 
share the exact same experiences and beliefs as the authors of a 
law. My misunderstanding of a particular law neither exempts 
me from the obligation to obey that law nor alters what it is that 
I must obey. In practice, that is, we routinely recognize that the 
written law's meaning is objective. Indeed, it is the objective, 
open-ended character of concepts that enables the law to govern 
prospectively. The application of a law written in the 18th 
century to disputes in the 21st rests on the premise that language 
refers to a greater number of instances than a law's authors may 
have experienced or imagined. Far from posing a threat to the 
objectivity of law, as the Originalist fears, the open-endedness of 
concepts is what allows the law to be applied objectively. For it 
enables our laws to be anchored in the actual nature of the 
phenomena named, rather than in the contents of select 
individuals' thoughts. When the Constitution says "Congress 
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech" or when 
a statute decrees that manufacturers may not emit chemicals of a 
certain toxicity, the way to determine which actions these laws 
allow and prohibit is to examine whether a particular action is of 
the relevant kind. We must examine the chemicals, the 
purported speech, the would-be abridgement, etc., rather than 
conduct a survey of people's opinions about those things. Just as 
a discussion of cats is not a discussion of my beliefs or of your 
beliefs, but a discussion of cats, so a law governing free speech or 
toxicity concerns those phenomena, rather than particular 
individuals' beliefs about those phenomena. 103 
103. For good discussion of this difference. see David 0. Brink. Legal Interpretation, 
Objectivity, and Morality. in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS 12-65 (Brian Leiter ed .. 
2001 ): David 0. Brink. Legal Theory. Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review. 17 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF .. 105. 105-4R (1988): see also Moore. Natural Law. supra note 89. at 294 
(arguing that a change in conventions about when to apply a word (such as "dead") is not 
a change in its meaning). 
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D. 0BJECfiONS TO MY CRITIQUE 
At this stage, let me pause to consider a few likely 
objections. 
First, it may seem unfair to charge Whittington and Barnett 
with failing to grasp the conceptual and objective character of 
law. For the very feature that makes their arguments appealing 
is their focus on the concept of the people's consent as 
authorizing the law and on the written expression of that consent 
as binding. This is, objectively, what the law is, they contend. 
Barnett, in particular, ur~es this brand of Originalism as more 
objective than the others. 1 
I certainly would not claim that Whittington and Barnett 
treat all words in a non-conceptual way. If they did, we could not 
hold this discussion, as we could not understand their thesis. 
(This is a significant point, which I will explain more fully in later 
criticisms.) Certain aspects of Whittington's critique of 
Textualism, which I have not discussed here, as well as Barnett's 
defense of the Ninth Amendment's protection of rights that are 
not explicitly named in the Constitution, definitely suggest a 
conceptual understanding of language. Whittington even 
acknowledges that the law is not merely words, but a set of ideas. 
It is, he says, "the embodied will of the people. ,w; The problem 
is that both authors treat language as conceptual and objective 
only intermittently, contradicting this to the extent that they 
endorse a dated public understanding- that historical fact, as 
opposed to the conceptual truth- as legally decisive. 
Consider Barnett. When it comes to applying the 
Constitution, Barnett treats some words (those of the Ninth 
Amendment) as calling for thought about the range of referents 
of the concepts named by those words. yet he treats other words 
as occasions for unthinking submission. He views the fact that 
the public understanding of a word in 1787 may have been 
mistaken in certain respects as no reason for a judge today to 
think about what the written word means and to apply the law 
accordingly (potentially applying the concept to a set of 
concretes that is not identical with those that his 1787 peer 
would have). On Barnett's view, the judge must defer to his 
predecessors not because their thinking about the concept was 
104. BARNETI. supra note 2. at 92. 94. While Barnett does not expressly avow the 
Popular Sovereignty Argument. as indicated earlier. we shall see later that by 
implication. he is committed to it. 
105. WHITIINGTON. supra note 1. at 59. 
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correct, but, essentially, because they spoke first. Barnett's sense 
of "original meaning" thus locks us into the comparative 
percepts of particular predecessors: we must slavishly implement 
whatever actual beliefs they held about concepts' meaning, 
rather than the concepts' objective meaning.lf'" 
The complete absence of a conceptuaL objective 
understanding of language is starkly revealed in Barnett's 
discussion of "commerce ... ul7 Article L Section 8 of the 
Constitution gives Congress the power "to regulate Commerce 
with foreign nations. and among the several states, and with the 
Indian tribes. "10' To determine the original meaning of this term, 
Barnett carefully examines its use in a variety of historical 
sources, including the state ratifying conventions. 109 In South 
Carolina and Virginia, he finds, the term was sometimes used to 
encompass shipping and navigation. Barnett offers no objection 
to those conceptions of commerce. The problem is that that is 
not what commerce is. Commerce. in essence, is the buying and 
selling of goods or services. 1111 Shipping. a means of 
transportation, is not by its nature a type of trade or commerce. 
While shipping could itself be a commercial activity and while 
shipping is frequently used as a means of facilitating trade, it is 
not a necessary facilitator and it is also used for many non-
commercial purposes, such as the transportation of tourists, 
troops, military equipment, or mail. ''Shipping" is a distinct 
concept, designating an activity that is different in kind from 
commerce. As such, any inclusion of shipping as among the 
referents of "commerce" was a mistake. (The same applies to 
''navigation," which is the science of directing the course of a 
ship, aircraft, or guided missile. 111 This, too. is a distinct concept 
from "commerce.") 
106. Rand would characterize Barnett as treating writtenness in a concrete-bound. 
non-conceptual way. For explanation of the concrete-bound approach. see PEIKOFF. 
supra note 70. at 127. 
107. This is a surprising place to find it. given that Barnett discusses commerce in 
order to criticize what he regards as judicial misapplications of the Commerce Clause. 
108. U.S. CONST. art. I.§ 8. 
109. BAR~ETT. supra note 2. at 282-89 (concerning the ratifying conventions). The 
discussion of other sources extends much further through his chapter 11. 
110. And this meaning is reflected in standard dictionary definitions. See 
"Commerce:· THE AMERICA~ HERITAGE D!CTIO~ARY OF THE El'GLISH LA"GCAGE. 
FOURTH EDIT!Ol'. (2004): "Commerce." Dictionarr.com. http://dictionary. 
reference.com/browse/commerce. I cite a dictionarv not as the criterion of words· 
meaning. but merely as a reflection of widespread recognition of the meaning of 
commerce. in this case. 
111. "Navigation.·· Dicrionary.Com. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/navigation. Similarly. 
Merriam Webster defines navigation as "the science of getting ships. aircraft. or 
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In his discussion of "commerce,'' Barnett emphasizes the 
original meaning's exclusion of agriculture, manufacture, and 
production, which in later years have often been asserted as 
falling within the scope of the commerce clause. 112 This exclusion 
was sound. on the Founders' part, and it is understandable that 
Barnett would highlight it. Nonetheless, it was a mistake for 
anyone to have included shipping or navigation in the concept of 
commerce, and for Barnett to accept that as the meaning of the 
law to which later generations are bound makes plain that his 
conception of meaning is fundamentally historical rather than 
objective. Indeed. he explicitly confirms this in a line that I have 
already cited: "If the public at the time of ratification understood 
the term 'commerce' in the Constitution to include trade, 
exchange, and navigation, then that is its original meaning." 113 
Barnett similarly reveals his ultimate subjectivism when he 
writes: "Originalists no more need to discern the content of 
actual or real rights than they need to discern activity that is 
·really' commerce. Instead. they can seek either the original 
intent of the framers or the original meaning of the text." 114 
While interpreters can certainly proceed objectively or non-
objectively in their determination of the history of the dominant 
understanding of a word's meaning at a particular time, an 
objective account of history is not the same thing as an objective 
account of a term's meaning. The acceptance of "commerce" as 
meaning trade and shipping and navigation reveals a failure to 
understand the distinctive kind of activity that commerce is. 
More damningly, it reveals a failure. on Barnett's part, to 
understand the nature of concepts. Barnett's implicit theory of 
meaning makes impossible the objective law that he claims to 
seek. 115 
spacecraft from place to place: especially: the method of determining position. course. 
and distance traveled."' "Navigation." Merriam Webster's Online Dictionary. 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/navigation. Again. I cite dictionaries not as 
the fundamental arbiter or determinant of meaning. but as often reflecting the 
widespread understandings of terms' meanings. Obviously. those popular understandings 
themselves are also fallible. 
112. After a series of decisions across several decades that took an expansive view of 
"commerce" and correlatively of the power that this clause granted to Congress. the 
court recently began to reverse that trend in United States v Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
and United States v Morrison. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See KERMIT ROOSEVELT III. THE 
MYTH OF JIJDICIAL ACTIVISM 171 passim (2008). 
113. BARNETT. supra note 2. at 293. 
114. /d. at 255. 
115. Notice that if the concept of "commerce" included shipping and navigation. we 
would be hard pressed to identify what it did not include. On what basis should 
"commerce" not also encompass "investigating crime" or "dancing" or "solving 
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Whittington, similarly, despite occasional intimations to the 
contrary, reveals the fundamentally non-conceptual and 
subjectivist character of his view when he claims that to the 
extent that the Founders did not share a common understanding 
of the meaning of certain textual provisions, those provisions are 
"meaningless." 116 His claim is not that the Founders, on occasion, 
deliberately enacted gibberish. What he has in mind are cases in 
which individual lawmakers' understandings of terms' meanings 
failed to correspond; different parties thought that they were 
agreeing to different things in supporting the same textual 
provlSlon. (Because the different understandings were 
unexpressed, the individuals did not realize their disagreement.) 
In such cases, Whittington believes, we must treat the text as 
meaningless. 
While the possibility of good faith misunderstandings 
between people arises under any theory of judicial 
interpretation, Whittington's conclusion reveals that, far from 
anchoring interpretation in fidelity to the written Constitution's 
objective meaning, Originalism's required fidelity is to particular 
beliefs that particular earlier men happened to hold. If differing 
opinion about words' meaning moots those words despite the 
fact that the words were enacted into law (and may even have 
had a clear public understanding at the time), then the words of 
the Constitution are not respected as the law of the land. What 
Whittington's ideal judge is actually faithful to is the subjective 
content of select individuals' minds. Anyone seeking to learn the 
meaning of a constitutional provision is not to consult the 
language of the law and ask: what does it say? Rather, he must 
ascertain which provisions resulted from the lawmakers' 
agreement over the meaning of their terms and which did not 
(which will require that he discover the divergences among 
crossword puzzles .. or ··making jello""? Those activities. after all. typically rely on the use 
of purchased items or services (e.g .. guns. forensics equipment. musicians. periodicals. 
pans). Indeed. why should even that indirect link with commerce be relevant. given that 
shipping and navigation can be all together independent of commerce~ Once terms are 
accepted as having non-objective meanings. we have no grounds for excluding any 
alleged referents of concepts. Objective law is thereby rendered impossible. 
Separately. I have no objection to the use of technical terms or terms of art in law. as 
long as the technical meanings of such terms and the contexts in which thev are 
applicable are widely understood by the relevant parties. Similarly. it is not 
objectionable. in principle. for lawmakers to sometimes stipulate. in drafting and 
enacting a law. a very particular meaning of a potentially ambiguous term. as long as thev 
are explicit about that special meaning. For the general intelligibility of the law. such 
cases should be the exception rather than the rule. 
I Hi. WHIITII\iGTON. supra note I. at 96. 
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lawmakers' beliefs that the lawmakers themselves were not 
aware of). Only the former (provisions resulting from agreement 
about their words' meaning) constitute valid law; the latter are 
"meaningless" and thus inapplicable; they carry no authority. 
(This is a long way from the "plain meaning" that many 
Originalists claim to uphold.) 
Let us turn. then, to a second, different kind of objection to 
my critique: concepts such as "cats" are too easy. Perhaps it is 
true that '"cats'' designates a definite kind of existent, but surely 
legal disputes concern far more complex, higher-level concepts. 
We can inspect a would-be cat to determine its membership in 
the class of cats in a way that we cannot inspect salient legal 
concepts. Whether a given action constitutes an "exercise of 
religion" or a "search" or '"commerce," for instance, is not 
available to perceptual confirmation in the way that whether 
something is a cat is. Thus the objectivity of "cats,'' even if I am 
right about such lower-level concepts, does not demonstrate 
objectivity of the legally contested concepts. The best we can do 
there is, as the Originalists maintain, defer to the public 
understanding at the time that a law was written. 
I chose "cats" as a deliberately simple example in order to 
introduce the basic nature of concepts (which Originalists, I 
think, fail to appreciate). Undoubtedly, our conceptual 
vocabulary ascends to much more abstract levels and it is the 
comparatively higher abstractions named in our laws that are the 
most frequently contested. Some of these pose genuinely hard 
cases. I do not believe that the proper view of objectivity will 
easily dissolve all disputes. Difficult cases, largely concerning the 
margins of a concept's scope, will continue to occupy judges. 
What I would maintain, however, is that all valid concepts 
function in essentially the same way as first-level concepts of the 
"cats" variety. That is, when we refer to "cats" -or to "animals" 
or "mammals'' or "species" or "living organisms" (which are 
higher level concepts)-or to concepts which are more abstract 
in more complex ways, such as "condominium" or "decoy" or 
·'edit" or "admonish" or "responsible" or "anxious" -or to legal 
staples such as "religion" or "search" or ''commerce" or 
"speech" or "deliberate" or "negligent" or "self-defense" -each 
of these words means something and not other things. A term 
that is used to designate particulars that lack a distinctive 
identity is not a valid concept. For it fails to perform the function 
of concepts, namely: to integrate, mentally, discrete existents on 
the basis of their sharing certain characteristics that distinguish 
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them from still other existents.~~' A concept is not simply a 
juxtaposition of properties; 11 ' its referents must constitute a 
distinctive type of existent. Words that do not clearly identify a 
distinctive kind of referent make for vague, ambiguous laws. The 
reason that we think that the rule of law requires clear. written 
law is so that the rules of government action can be known to all 
(and so that people can plan accordingly). That presupposes, 
however, that words-even words representing highly abstract 
concepts- have definite meanings; it presupposes that "search" 
means one kind of thing and not another; that ''commerce" 
designates activities of one kind, not of others. Whistling a happy 
d l'f 114 tune oes not qua 1 y. 
Legal disputes arise- understandably- because the exact 
range of particulars that higher level concepts encompass is not 
self-evident and can sometimes be difficult to ascertain. This is 
especially true when we first apply law to areas of human activity 
that did not previously exist, such as property rights in 
cyberspace. These disputes do not arise because higher-level 
concepts lack objective meaning, however. Indeed. if that were 
the case, even the Originalists' quest for fidelity to "what the 
public at time t thought words x, y and z meant" would be 
impossible, since we could have no objective knowledge of what 
that public understanding was. The concepts "public" and 
''understanding," after alL are themselves far more abstract than 
"cats." If abstraction were incompatible with objectivity. then 
any attempt to express an abstraction (the "public 
understanding," in this case) would be fated to non-objective 
interpretation that renders the thesis of Originalism capable of 
meaning anything-and thus reveal that it actually means 
nothing. A defender of Originalism. in other words. cannot 
simultaneously deny the objectivity of higher-level concepts and 
meaningfully assert his own thesis. 
At this stage, one might attempt to press a related objection: 
the problem is not that "cats" is too simple a concept; the 
problem is that cats are a natural kind. Dworkin. for instance, 
117. See RAND. supra note R3. at 12-15.41.69. 153. 
11R. David Harriman. Induction and Experimelltal Method. THE OBJECTIVE 
STANDARD. Spring 2007. at 106. 
119. For more on invalid concepts and on when it is appropriate to form a concept. 
see RAND. supra note 83. at 49. 70--73. She regards the formation of many concepts as 
optional. An invalid concept. however. represents an attempt "to integrate errors. 
contradictions or false propositions... /d. at 49. Harriman offers some historical 
illustrations of invalid concepts. such as "natural motion" and "violent motion" in 
ancient Greek physics. Harriman. supra note 118. at RO. 106. 
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contends that "analysis of political concepts cannot be shown to 
be descriptive on the model of scientific investigation into 
natural kinds. Liberty has no DNA. .,J:i) Even if respect for the 
nature of existents has some role in a general explanation of 
meaning. as I have urged. the objection is that this Ra:1dian 
account is overly realist. Language is actually intersubjective. 
Words' meanings depend, at least in part, on people's practices. 
on how a community of speakers chooses to use words. There 
are no "unchanging essences'' that fix words' meanings. Yet my 
defense of concepts' objectivity misleadingly excludes the human 
contribution. Indeed, the reason that the example of a sequence 
of prime numbers seems to shield against an unruly. non-
objective "open-endedness" is that with mathematical terms, 
human beings stipulate firm, unwavering criteria of concepts' 
referents in a way that we do not consecrate the criteria of most 
other concepts. What is a "prime number" is not open to dispute 
and does not evolve in the way that whether or not something is 
a "search" can. My opponent's larger contention is that objective 
meaning is not set by the nature of existents; it is set by us, 
adopting standards that are more rigid in some fields than in 
others. Thus while my account of the objectivity of concepts such 
as "cats" may be valid, such natural kinds reflect only one, 
narrow type of concepts and are hardly representative. 
I would agree that concepts are "intersubjective" in the 
trivial sense acknowledged earlier that human beings assign the 
words by which we refer to various concepts, tacitly agreeing 
that "c-a-t" will mean cat, "l-a-w" will mean law. and so on. 
More significantly, we also determine which concepts to form. 
We can only do so effectively, however, to the extent that we 
heed existents' actual natures and identify their fundamental 
similarities and differences with one another. This is the 
inescapable fact that drives the ''realism" of my portrait of 
concepts. It is crucial not to confuse this realism with what Rand 
calls "intrinsicism," however. 121 The idea that some kinJs are 
"natural'' encourages the belief that knowledge of these "natural 
kind'' concepts is passive and that certain things' intrinsic nature 
(cat-ness. tiger-ness, gold-ness, etc.) is simply revealed to 
attentive observers. Rand emphatically rejects this. The realism 
in her account of concept formation does not consist of the 
passive receipt of existents' imprint of their "intrinsic" character 
120. DWORKI!'. supra note 80. at 153: see also id. at 10-11. 152-54.224. 
L~l. RA:SD. supra note 83. at 52-D4: see also id. at 46-47: sources cited supra note 94. 
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on us. (Indeed, given the views that the term ""realism" is often 
used to characterize, it is arguable whether that is an apt label 
for her position.) In Rand's view. essence is epistemological 
rather than metaphysical. 122 Knowing a thing's essence-knowing 
what kind of thing it is-requires thoughtful activity on the part 
of human observers. This is true not only of higher-level or 
"non-natural" concepts, but of all concepts. For even the 
"'perceptual confirmation'' of something's being a cat is not 
wholly perceptual. It also depends on human judgments about 
which features of the specimen being considered to regard as 
indicative of membership in that class. 
Consider: Why don't we call zebras "tigers," given that 
zebras are also striped, four-legged mammals? Why group tigers 
together as one kind, excluding zebras. rather than join tigers 
and zebras in the same kind? On what basis should we regard 
those characteristics that are shared by tigers that are not also 
shared by zebras as a more appropriate basis for conceptual 
classification than those characteristics of tigers that are held in 
common with zebras? The answers to such questions cannot be 
found through observation alone. Touching an animal more 
carefully. looking at it more closely, or employing any of the five 
senses unaided by active thought cannot resolve these questions. 
Nothing wears its fundamentality on its sleeve. Distinct 
phenomena (be they entities. events, properties, relationships. 
etc.) do not announce to us: ""and here's what's most important 
about me" or "here's the kind of thing I am." When we seek to 
establish whether a particular existent is fundamentally similar 
to certain other existents in a specific respect (is this a possum or 
a raccoon? gold or fool's gold? liberal or conservative? 
deliberate or accidental?), it is human beings who must identify 
what the fundamental distinguishing characteristics are. 
In order to form any concept- to identify anything as of a 
kind. be it natural or artificial, simple and seemingly obvious or 
complex and abstract-a person must use his mind to judge 
particular existents' salient similarities and differences from 
other existents. He must integrate concretes into a concept by 
essentials, identifying their conceptual common denominator 
and distinguishing characteristics. While he must heed existents' 
actual, independent natures in order to form concepts 
effectively, because no categories of classification are found 
readymade in nature. it is for human beings to identify what the 
122. RAND. supra note 83. at 52. 
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salient characteristics are. 121 What is .. salient" will depend, in 
part, on the purpose of the classification. 12~ 
The point is that the objectivity of concepts does not entail 
their "given-ness." No concepts' meanings are simply revealed to 
us. Consequently. the charge that Rand's account of meaning is 
'"too realist'' relies on an erroneous impression of what her view 
• !~:" 
IS. 
What all of this brings us back to is the fact that even the 
concepts of our law that are frequently debated in court can be 
objective. This is not to say that all of our laws or all of the 
concepts used therein are in fact objective, but my critique of 
various laws' actual objectivity is an issue for another day. The 
point. rather. is that the concepts that are properly used in a 
legal system are as capable of having objective meaning as any 
other concepts. 12" 
Admittedly, higher-level concepts are more demanding of 
us insofar as knowledge of their objective meaning requires 
123. The less controversial a classification is. the less we notice the human activitv 
that it relies on. Long-entrenched classifications that can sometimes seem as if they are 
products of merely passive observations have not been altered or much debated because 
they were well-formed in the first place and because one rarely encounters difficult-to-
classify borderline instances of those concepts. 
124. The purposes of a biologist's taxonomic classification are different from those 
of a person contemplating the acquisition of a pet or of a search or seeing-eye animal. for 
instance. which are different from the purposes of specific medical research. Thus we 
cross-list members of differing animal species in additional conceptual divisions. such as 
wild or tame. predator or prey. carnivore or herbivore. Similarly. we classify human 
beings into many cross-cutting classes. such as by age. gender. profession. nationality. 
marital status. and political affiliation. Yet for no purpose are the appropriate criteria 
simply given. Indeed. even the identification of biological species is subject to political 
pressures. See Hail Linnaeus. THE ECONOMIST. May 19.2007. at 13. 
125. In contrasting her view of concepts with the major historical alternatives. Rand 
characterizes concepts as .. neither revealed nor invented. but as produced by man ·s 
consciousness in accordance with the facts of reality. as mental integrations of factual 
data computed by man-as the products of a cognitive method of classification whose 
processes must be performed by man. but whose content is dictated by reality:· RASD. 
supra note 83. at 54. For further differentiation of the objective from the intrinsic. see 
PEIKOFF. supra note 70. at 142-46: Peikoff. supra note 89. at 101-03: Smith. Objecth·e 
Morality. supra note 100: Darryl Wright. Evaluative Concepts and Objective Values: Rand 
on Moral Objectivity. 25 Soc. PHIL & POL'Y 149. 149-81 (2008): Darryl Wright. 
Evahwtive Concepts and Objective Values 8. paper presented at Conference on Concepts 
and Objectivity. University of Pittsburgh. September 2007. For a defense of the idea that 
similarity (as opposed to sameness) relationships are the basis of species concepts. see 
Jason Rheins. Similarity and Species Concepts. in 8 CARVING NATURE AT ITS JOINTS-
TOPICS Il'." COl':TEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY (J. Campbell. J. O'Rourke. & M. Slater eds .. 
forthcoming). 
126. I discuss the basic nature of objective law in Tara Smith. Objective Law. in AY!' 
RA:'W: A COMPANION TO HER WORKS AND THOUGHT (Allan Gotthelf & Gregory 
Salmieri eds .. forthcoming 2010). 
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understanding all of the subordinate concepts that they 
integrate, which demands accuracy in the identification of those 
units' conceptual common denominators and distinguishing 
characteristics. The units of a higher-level concept can be many 
not only in number. but also in kind (integrating concepts of 
entities, actions, states of consciousness, relationships, etc., such 
as in the concepts "prize," "persevere,'' "contract," and 
"property"). The subordinate concepts may also vary in the level 
of their abstractness. This complexity is no bar to such higher-
level concepts' objectivity, however. What it signifies is simply 
that knowledge of a concept's objective meaning requires 
(though is not exhausted by) knowledge of its constituent 
elements. We have no reason to assume that this is beyond us. 127 
Consider the example of a search, the subject of the Fourth 
Amendment. The concept of a "search'' is a higher-level 
integration of at least three different kinds of things: an activity. 
a manner, and a purpose. According to the dictionary, to search 
is "to make a thorough examination of: look over carefully in 
order to find something; explore." 12s We speak of ''searching'' to 
refer to a person's inspecting in a careful, thorough, and 
persistent way so as to find certain materials or to learn certain 
information. The fact that the answer to questions of whether 
certain police activity constitutes a search is not always obvious 
does not entail that no answer exists or that every answer is 
equally correct. Indeed, if we could not distinguish true from 
false answers about the referents of "search," the Fourth 
Amendment ought to be repealed as hollow, useless 
Constitutional clutter that only wastes the court's resources. In 
fact, much as people might disagree with the court's application 
of the concept in a particular case, they disagree precisely 
because they believe that the court has misunderstood the actual 
meaning of "search"- the objective meaning of the term. 124 
Difficult questions at the periphery of a concept's range of 
referents do not reveal the concept's lack of objective meaning. 
Nor do we ordinarily treat them as if they do. 
127. Indeed. the standard of living in the contemporary West shatters that 
suggestion. If people did not understand the sophisticated abstractions that many people 
today do. they would not have been able to produce the array of goods and services that 
they have. 
128. ''Search."' THE AMERICA!\" HERITAGE DICTIO-;ARY OF THE E:"GLISH 
LA-;GL'AGE. FOL:RTH EDITIO!\" (2004 ): .. Search."' Dictionan·.com: http://dictionary. 
reference.com/browse/search. 
129. Thus the disagreements about the Court's decision in Kvllo v United States, 
533U.S. 27(2001) (involving the use of thermal imaging technology).· 
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"Evidence." to take another legal example, is also a 
relatively abstract concept. The admissibility, in court, of 
evidence as opposed to hearsay depends on recognizing the 
difference between the two, which, in turn, depends on 
understanding the objective meaning of each. If they had no 
objective meanings, there could be no recognizable difference 
between them that could be enforced in court; the court's 
practice of treating someone's say-so about a conversation 
differently from a tape recording of that conversation would be a 
charade that contributes nothing to the justice of the court's 
resolution of the case. Here again, the fact that people might 
argue with a judge's rulings on whether particular submissions 
constitute admissible evidence or inadmissible hearsay does not 
refute the distinction. On the contrary, the intensity of such 
arguments testifies to the presumed legitimacy of the distinction 
and correspondingly, to the presumed objectivity of the two 
concepts on which that distinction depends. 
In answer to the charge of offering unrepresentative 
examples, then, my claim is that all concepts function, in 
principle, in the same manner as "cats." Whether reflecting 
lower or higher levels of abstraction, allegedly natural or not, 
legally controversial or part of one's taken-for-granted routine. 
all concepts must be objective in order to be valid. And the law 
must be expressed in objective terms in order to have a specific. 
coherent meaning and thus be able to properly do its job. 
To be thorough, I should also comment more directly on the 
objection to my example of prime numbers. The gist of that 
objection, recall, was that prime numbers are given an 
immutable, unequivocal meaning by human beings that most 
other concepts lack; thus they are not a sound basis for 
defending the open-endedness of concepts from worries about 
subjectivism. 
Leaving aside much more fundamental arguments about the 
justification of mathematical concepts, it suffices to observe here 
that the understanding of valid concepts of any kind is fixed at a 
given time. This means that at that time, the concept is thought 
to refer to a certain sort of thing and not others. Bear in mind 
that on Rand's view, a concept is not to be equated with its 
definition. Further, a definition is not a statement of the criteria 
of membership in the class of things conceptualized. 130 When we 
130. See PEIKOFF. supra note 70. at 101-05: RAND. supra note 83. at 235-38: Moore. 
Nawral Law. supra note 89. at 294. 337-38. 
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are concerned with the criteria of class membership (as in the 
objection to my prime number example), notice that such 
criteria will not be equally precise in all areas, as all conceptual 
integrations do not require the same level of precision. How 
fine-grained the standard of class membership should be 
depends largely on the function of a particular concept. Its 
function will depend in part on what other concepts in close 
proximity have already ''carved up" wider groups of concretes. It 
makes sense to distinguish frogs from toads on finer grounds 
than those on which we distinguish frogs from turtles, for 
instance. It makes sense to distinguish vegans from vegetarians 
by more precise criteria than those that we use to distinguish 
vegetarians from meat-eaters. Thus the greater specificity of the 
criteria for being a prime number than that of the criteria used 
for many other concepts is itself no indication of greater 
objectivity. 
Further, insofar as a definition of a concept (which, again, is 
not the equivalent of the criteria of class membership) reflects 
the present state of human knowledge about the fundamental 
distinguishing characteristics of the units of that concept, what 
remains true of all concepts is that at a given time, that concept 
will be understood to encompass certain existents and to exclude 
others. The definition of a concept need not be specified in a 
way that precludes the possibility of encountering difficult-to-
classify borderline cases or of later revision (as the definition of 
a prime number seems to) in order to be objective. The fact that 
definitions of certain concepts are more likely than others to be 
refined in the future simply reflects the fact that definitions 
reflect the state of human knowledge, which is naturally limited 
at any given time, fallible at all times, and capable of future 
growth. As human beings learn more about the referents of a 
concept, we may eventually alter the definition of the concept to 
reflect a more accurate grasp of its units' essential distinguishing 
characteristic. 131 This does not reveal that such concepts lack 
identity or objective meaning, however, for it does not mean that 
they fail to pick out a distinctive kind of existent. The upshot is 
that my prime number example does deliver its intended point: 
any objective concept specifies a definite, distinctive kind of 
131. Moore's discussion of death is a good example. See Moore. Natural Law. supra 
note 89. at 294. 308--09. Rand discusses the contextual character of definitions. illustrating 
With the example of the advance in human beings' understanding of the concept ""man ... 
See RA:>m. supra note 83. at 43-47. 
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existent, thereby excluding other existents. The number of 
referents that might be of that kind, however, is open-ended. 
I suspect that this objection to the prime number example is 
fueled by an intrinsicist image of concepts of the sort implied by 
the assertion of "natural" kinds. For on that view, the definition 
of a concept should preclude the possibility of encountering any 
borderline cases and of any later revisions of that definition. 
That is, if readymade metaphysical essences inhere in every 
existent, such that "objective" knowledge consists simply in the 
immediate apprehension of such eternal verities, then a person 
either knows a concept or he doesn't; the required revelation 
either has or has not taken place. Learning more about an 
essence is out of the question. On Rand's view, in contrast, 
objectivity is a function of man's identification of the similarities 
and differences among the existents that he observes. As his 
knowledge of the existents grows, his knowledge of the 
relationships among them grows and his understanding of 
concepts correspondingly may change. (I stress: his 
understanding. not the concepts' referents.) Man's identification 
of a group of things' fundamental distinguishing characteristics is 
always, inevitably. relative to his present state of knowledge. uc 
E. THE 0RIGINALISTS' EQUIVOCATION OVER "FIXED" 
MEANING 
Let's return. then, to the central thrust of the Written 
Constitution Argument: what is it that the people are ratifying, if 
the text of the law isn't fixed? In adopting a particular written 
formulation of a law, what are those people agreeing to, if not 
that original written meaning? 133 
This is certainly a reasonable question. The Originalists' 
answer is sloppy, however. For it equivocates between two 
senses of "fixed." conflating distinct possibilities: an interpreter 
132. See RAND. supra note 83. at 46-47. In "Why Originalism Won't Die." I 
characterized objective meaning in what I now think is a potentially misleading way. By 
recommending that judges proceed according to "the objective criteria" for identifying 
the meaning of a concept rather than the law's authors' (or a previous generation's) 
criteria. one might assume that I was equating objective criteria with objective meaning. 
This would be a mistake. My aim in that portion of the essay was to contrast the 
subjectivism of Originalism with objectivity of meaning. but it is important to appreciate 
that the criteria that one employs for applying a concept are reflections of the present 
state of knowledge of a concept's referents rather than direct reflections of the referents 
themselves. See Smith. supra note 2. at 193-97. On Rand's view. as I have been 
emphasizing here. the meaning of a concept is its referents. See RNm. supra note 83. at 
235-38. 
133. See BARNETI. supra note 2. at 88. 117: WHITIIC\iGTON. supra note 1. at 55-56. 
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swapping the concept named in a law for a different concept, and 
an interpreter respecting the concept named while refining its 
list of referents. A judge may not do the former. For example, if 
a law concerning the financial industry refers to "banks," he may 
not treat the word as he would when reading environmental 
legislation that uses "banks" to refer to coastal lands, such as the 
Outer Banks of North Carolina. Those uses of "banks" name 
distinct concepts. Yet it is natural to do the latter, that is, to 
refine the catalog of particulars that a concept refers to (as when 
we add to or subtract from our lists of particulars that qualify 
under the concepts "speech'' or "toxic" or "endangered," for 
instance). In fact, a judge must do that if laws are to be objective 
and if we are not to revert to mind-reading. The concept being 
interpreted is "fixed" by the language of the law. That is, the 
kind of referents is fixed, but the exact list of referents that the 
• !14 
concept encompasses IS not. · 
Admittedly, this can get tricky because we sometimes revise 
our definitions of concepts as well as our lists of their referents. 
A revised definition does not constitute a change in concepts, 
however. For a concept is not interchangeable with its definition 
(as I noted above). A definition is our most accurate possible 
statement of the essential nature of the units subsumed under a 
concept relative to all currently available knowledge. 135 But our 
present understanding of a concept does not determine the 
nature of the things identified by that concept. It is crucial to 
recognize that our understanding of a concept is not the subject 
matter of that concept; it is not the concept's referent. A word 
refers to a kind of existent, not to beliefs about a kind of 
existent. Thus it would be a mistake to interpret language as if it 
did. Yet that is what the Originalist method does, by enshrining 
the actual, incomplete and imperfect understanding of concepts 
that were held by particular men at the time of enactment as 
constituting words' meaning. Originalism elevates subjective 
beliefs over objective meaning. 
To fully appreciate the sense of the distinction between 
swapping one concept for another and respecting a single 
concept while revising its list of referents, consider a simple 
example. Imagine that people in 1800 had the concept "frogs" 
and used it to refer to the same type of things that we use "frogs" 
134. See BRINK. supra note 103: Christopher R. Green. Originalism and the Sense-
Reference Distinction. 50 ST. LOL'IS U. L.J. 555 (2006). 
135. Recall Rand's definition of definitions. see supra text accompanying note 87. 
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for today, although they had a very incomplete understanding of 
the nature of frogs, by contemporary standards. Now suppose 
that we, today, could speak to those people and fill them in on 
all that we have subsequently learned, pointing out many 
properties of frogs that they were not aware of. It is possible that 
if we informed them that frogs had certain features, they would 
respond: "no, that's not what we meant, that's not what we were 
referring to; you have misunderstood our concept of 'frogs."' It 
is equally possible, however, that if we had made certain 
different observations, pointing out some other facts that we 
have since learned about frogs, they would say: '"Wow. we hadn't 
realized that; how fascinating,'' offering no denial that that is the 
thing that they were referring to (despite being informed of their 
comparative ignorance and even of errors concerning particular 
features of frogs). The point is simple: not any departure from 
the exact concretes in their minds (or even from the exact 
criteria that they used) constitutes a failure to use that same 
concept. Fidelity to the law allows for growth in knowledge 
about things that are already known incompletely and 
imperfectly. Not all deviations from the precise list of referents 
or from the criteria of a concept's meaning that the people of the 
time would have supplied constitute treachery against that law. 
(When whales were re-classified as mammals, we weren't 
changing the subject.f'" 
What is important for objective legal interpretation, then, is 
that judges respect the concepts that lawmakers were expressing 
in the written law. The sense in which the original understanding 
of words is relevant is simply that we must ask, in effect: "What 
language were they speaking? How were these words used, in 
the relevant context, at that time? What concepts did they stand 
for?" (Had "bank," for instance, already acquired both its 
financial and physiographic meanings? Did "saloon" still mean 
136. Others have recognized the distinction between swapping concepts and 
respecting the same concept while revising its list of referents. though they have not 
always characterized the basic distinction in the exact same way. Dworkin. for instance. 
distinguishes concepts from conceptions and semantic Originalism from expectations 
Originalism. See DWORKIN. supra note 73. at 134-36: Dworkin. Comment. in SCALIA. 
supra note 7 at. 115. 120. Dworkin writes that "It is a fallacy to infer from the fact that 
the semantic intentions of historical statements inevitably fix what the document they 
made says that keeping faith with what they said means enforcing the document as they 
hoped or expected or assumed it would be enforced." DWORKIN. JUSTICE. supra note 
80. at 123-24 (emphasis in original): see also id. at 29-30. Dworkin does not identify the 
misguided notion of objectivity operative in Originalism. however. See also HART. supra 
note 21. at 246 (distinguishing the meaning of a concept from the criteria of its 
application). 
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'"salon"? 1'- Had '"gay" yet acquired the meaning 
"homosexual"?(' Judges' responsibility is to discover which 
concept was referred to by the words in the law and to then use 
the objective meaning of that concept in applying that law to 
contemporary disputes. It is possible. of course, that a concept 
will sometimes be incorrectly understood by judges and 
erroneously thought to encompass units which it truly does not, 
or to not encompass certain units that it does, in fact. This does 
not entail that applying concepts objectively is the inappropriate 
interpretive method, however. The possibility of misapplication 
arises under any theory. An Originalist judge can, by an 
Originalist's standards. mistake what the original public 
understanding was at a given time just as much as a non-
Originalist judge can err in employing his method of 
interpretation. We do not, because people sometimes use words 
incorrectly, renounce the use of language or surrender the 
distinction between proper and improper application of 
concepts. Indeed, we rely on that distinction in order to identify 
mistakes. (It is because we could never guarantee against the 
possibility of human misjudgment that we should seek highly 
intelligent, conceptually skilled thinkers for the court- people 
who are good at objectively assessing proposed concretizations 
of the abstractions that our law consists of.) 
Originalists are undoubtedly right, then, that we may not 
interpret the law in a way that alters its words' original meaning. 
That is not what we are doing, however, when we recognize that 
a law encompasses certain concretes that are different from 
those envisioned by the public at the time of the law's enactment 
Uust as we would not be defying the First Amendment if we took 
its prohibition of the establishment of religion to encompass 
Mormonism, even though that religion was not developed until 
the 19th century, or its protection of speech to encompass 
email). A word's "original meaning" cannot be equated with the 
finite, time-bound set of concrete referents or criteria for 
identifying referents that Originalists insist. Barnett's "lock-in" is 
appropriate only to the extent that it offers fidelity to the 
137. ··Saloon."' Online Etrmology Dictionary. from Dictionary.com: http://dictionary. 
reference.com/browse/saloon. 
138. Literally. of course. we must ftrst know whether the relevant language is English 
or German. for instance. but further. we must know whether an American form of 
English or a British form is being used. As quick examples of the difference: for the 
British ... boot"" refers to the trunk of an automobile and ""lift .. to an elevator. though 
these are not standard American uses of those words. Thanks to Dave Odden for 
reminding me of this sort of difference. 
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concepts written into law. The insistence on adherence to the 
original public understanding, however- understood as 
Originalists understand that, as the frozen set of beliefs of a 
particular set of people- shackles us to the wrong set of 
constraints. Originalism locates the law's meaning in people's 
beliefs about the things they spoke of, rather than in the nature 
of those things. Objectivity in law is anchored in the latter. 139 (To 
be clear: while some Originalists might like to be open to 
respecting room for the sort of growth and correction of 
understanding that I have been discussing in this section, the 
conception of words' meaning that is logically entailed by the 
Popular Sovereignty and Written Constitution Arguments 
commits them to a more restrictive notion of meaning that is at 
odds with it. If others who support Originalism through 
arguments other than these two wish to accept the open-ended 
nature of meaning that I have sketched, they do so by veering 
away from original meaning- in the sense that Originalists 
typically use that term- being the salient feature of their view.) 
F. THE fLAW IN THE CONTRACT ANALOGY 
In light of all this, we can now appreciate the defect in the 
contract analogy employed on behalf of the Written Constitution 
Argument. Recall the thrust of that argument: just as we 
determine exactly what contracting parties agreed to on the basis 
of the public understanding of their written words' meaning, so 
when it comes to interpreting a law, we must adhere to the 
public understanding of the time the law was enacted because 
this is what those people agreed to. 
What this reasoning neglects is the fact that contracts are 
respected as legally binding only when they concern exchanges 
of things that fall within the rightful domains of the contracting 
parties. Contracts are not valid when they are agreements to 
exchange things that the law does not recognize the parties as 
having the authority to exchange. Even if I am a mentally 
competent adult with full legal standing to enter into contracts, I 
cannot trade things that are not mine. I cannot, for example, 
139. Indeed. the Originalists' desired .. lock-in·· sounds eerily reminiscent of Scalia's 
assertion that the .. whole purpose .. of a constitution is .. to prevent change ... SCALIA. 
supra note 7. at 40. This evades the crucial difference between judges changing what the 
law is (or acting as if the law were something other than what it is) and judges applying 
the existing law in a way that reflects a changed understanding of its full meaning and 
implications. The latter, I have been contending. is legitimate so long as that changed 
understanding falls within the bounds of the objective meaning of the relevant concepts 
in the relevant law. 
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commit my boss's son to repair my sister's car for $100 (from 
her) without obtaining each of their authorization of this 
arrangement. In contract law, we do not treat individuals as 
enjoying a free hand to agree to whatever they like. We ask not 
only '"what did they agree to?" but also "'what did they have the 
right to agree to?" The aspect of this that is salient to 
interpreting the Constitution is that we do not treat individuals 
as holding the right to use words in whatever peculiar fashion 
they might like. Individuals are not entitled. when entering into 
legally binding agreements with others. to confine their words' 
meaning to their own current understanding of that meaning. 
They may not alter words' meaning by fiat, declaring: '"the word 
x means only as much as I presently think it does" and thereby 
be legally accountable only to that understanding of x. Such an 
idiosyncratic use of language would make it impossible for 
parties to know what they were agreeing to and for the 
government to enforce their agreement. The legal authorities 
would have no objective means of resolving disputes about what 
obligations each party had. in fact. assumed. Even if the two 
parties adopted a private code that assigned peculiar meanings 
to words (a code in which "corn" means "'toes," '"cook'' means 
'"compose a symphony," and '"red" means '"July 14," for 
instance). the need for external intelligibility remains. That code 
would have to be spelled out in terms whose meaning was 
accessible to the third parties asked to enforce it. Parties to a 
contract, in short, must abide by the objective meaning of words. 
The same is true when it comes to constitutional 
interpretation. For the contention that the written character of 
the Constitution entails Originalism seeks to have language used 
in an equally subjective way as those who would ask to be 
accountable only to their personal understandings of the 
meanings of the terms in their contracts. If contemporary 
interpreters of law are to treat its words as referring only to the 
inevitably limited, fallible understandings of the people alive 
when it was enacted, we render objective law impossible. 
VII. PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING ORIGINALISM'S 
FATAL CONTRADICTION 
The best way to ensure the rule of law, according to the 
Originalists under discussion, is to apply the original public 
understanding of the language of our law. The Originalist 
method assumes that, because words lack objective meaning, we 
must, instead of seeking that. seek to discover the historical fact 
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of what the understanding of particular words was at the time of 
law's enactment. The arguments for Public Understanding 
Originalism examined here, however, depend on the denial of 
that very premise (the premise that objective meaning is 
impossible). To see this, I begin with the more obvious 
• • J.j() 
mcons1stency. 
The possibility of an "original meaning'' of the law that we, 
today, could either uphold or betray depends on words' having 
objective and univocal meanings. If they did not, there would be 
no object of agreement for an earlier generation's will or words 
to converge around and that could later be pointed to as the 
meaning of the public of that time. 141 It is significant that, 
according to the Originalist picture. the law's authors are not 
seen as simply inheriting words' meaning from still earlier 
people. Rather, they are portrayed as having had a particular 
understanding of their own of what various words meant. That is 
what they enacted into law, the Originalist contends, and that is 
what later generations are bound to adhere to. But, it is logical 
to ask, if those people are not seen as having necessarily 
inherited words' meaning from the "public understanding" of 
some still earlier time, why are we? If we must accept that our 
predecessors who enacted laws were capable of identifying what 
various words did and did not refer to-in effect, of using 
language objectively-Originalism offers no reason to suppose 
that people today are not capable of doing the same. Nor does it 
provide reason to suppose that people today are not entitled to 
do the same. This inconsistency reflects the deeper fracture at 
the spine of Originalism. 
The conclusion of Public Understanding Originalism 
contradicts the reasoning offered on its behalf. What the Popular 
Sovereignty Argument and Written Constitution Argument 
actually show is that Originalism depends on higher-level 
concepts which are understood to be objective- the very thing 
that Originalism's method denies. That is, Originalism as a 
method (the conclusion of these two arguments) gives the 
140. Originalists often speak as if original meaning and objective meaning are one 
and the same. of course. as in a previously cited passage from Barnett (claiming that 
Public Understanding Originalism .. seeks the public or objective meaning that a 
reasonable listener would place on the words used." BARNETT. supra note 2. at 92). This 
is indicative of their failure to grasp what objectivity actually is. 
141. I alluded to this earlier. see supra text accompanying note 105 and page 41. Also 
note that this realization is implicit in the passage from Spooner quoted by Barnett. 
though that message seems to have been lost on Barnett. See supra text accompanying 
notes 46--49. 
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subjective beliefs of the public at time t the power to dictate the 
meaning of words. Yet the reasoning for that method relies on 
the tacit presupposition that the Constitution expresses a 
meaning that is independent of anyone's beliefs about its 
meaning. For that meaning is what the public at some earlier 
date allegedly understood and that meaning is what was 
expressed through the enacted written words. 
To put the point slightly differently: The conclusion that 
Public Understanding Originalism is the proper method of 
interpretation assumes that no objective meaning is possible. (If 
it were, we could investigate that. Instead, Originalists hold that 
reference to a historical belief is the best we can do.) At the 
same time, the arguments in support of that conclusion assume 
that objective meaning is possible, since that is what "the will of 
the people" and "the meaning of the written words" refer to. If 
the premises of these two arguments are true, in other words, 
they show that the conclusion of the arguments is false. Meaning 
cannot be both objective and non-objective. For the premises to 
be true, meaning must be objective. Yet if meaning is objective, 
then the conclusion- the propriety of the Originalist method 
(which denies the possibility of objective meaning)-is false. 142 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Public Understanding Originalism is widely regarded, even 
by its critics, as the strongest form of Originalism because it is 
the most objective. My claim is that this is exactly what it is not, 
given its understanding of "original meaning,'' which interprets 
law's language to reflect only the actual, inevitably limited 
conceptions of words' meanings held by the public at a particular 
date. If we take the meaning of law's words to be merely what 
certain people's words meant to them-those individuals' 
conceptions, no more and no less-we revert to the mind-reading 
games and variability that sank the Original Intent school. 
Although Public Understanding Originalism aspires to an 
objective reading of our law, because Originalism does not 
understand the nature of objectivity, it collapses into the very 
subjectivism that it seeks to oppose. While Barnett seeks to 
distance himself from the more transparent subjectivism of the 
Popular Sovereignty rationale for Originalism, his preferred 
142. This contradiction became much clearer to me thanks to discussion with Greg 
Salmieri. 
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Written Constitution Argument carries equally subjectivist 
implications. For the conclusion of that argument, the purported 
propriety of Public Understanding Originalism, in practice treats 
the people as sovereign. The original understanding (as 
advocates of the Written Constitution Argument interpret it) 
simply represents the will of the people of an earlier era. It is the 
enshrinement of majority will, cosmetically enhanced by the halo 
of history. The fact that it is historical lends an aura of legitimacy 
to its claim on us. Yet it is merely a glorified populism, 
underneath. The will of the people holds no more authority over 
the individual when it is draped in words that are treated as code 
for particular historical individuals' conceptions of words' 
meanings (as in the Written Constitution Argument) than it does 
when stripped bare (as in the Popular Sovereignty Argument). 
What all Originalists fail to appreciate is that the popular 
understanding of certain words, however accurately we come to 
understand what that understanding actually was at a given date, 
remains a fact fundamentally about consciousnesses, rather than 
about reality. Consequently, it cannot sustain the objective rule 
of law. 
The Originalists' desire for an interpretive methodology 
that respects a stable constitution as the anchor of our law is 
unimpeachable. Equally worthy is the Public Understanding 
school's desire to overcome the subjectivism that cripples other 
forms of Originalism as well as, from the other flank, the "living 
constitutionalists" (at least, on certain undisciplined versions of 
what that refers to). Because the unqualified will of the people is 
not the ultimate source of our government's authority and 
because written words do not mean simply what the people of a 
certain era think they mean, however, the two defenses of Public 
Understanding Originalism considered here, initially so 
persuasive, fail. What is crucial to understanding the objective 
meaning of law is an appreciation of the conceptual nature of 
language and of the objective, open-ended nature of concepts. 
The Public Understanding school, unfortunately, chains us to the 
closed conceptions of words' meanings that have been held by 
particular individuals. It attempts to reduce what is 
fundamentally a conceptual question (about the meaning of 
words) into a historical one (what did earlier people believe?). 
By reducing the judge's task from interpretation to imitation, 
Originalism. in practice, replaces its coveted rule of law with the 
rule of men- earlier men. 
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Some might suspect that I have rejected Originalism only to 
embrace what sounds like simply another form of it (at least by 
implication, insofar as I have suggested my preferred view here). 
This would be a mistake. I reject Originalism entirely for the 
central reason that its thrust focuses on a secondary issue. 
History does have a role in proper legal interpretation; 
discerning the original meaning is significant insofar as we need 
to identify and respect the concepts that were expressed in the 
written law. Fidelity to that, however. hardly provides a method 
for judges to follow in applying the law. It will not be adequate 
guidance to remind judges who must decide contemporary 
controversies: "avoid anachronistic readings of words." The 
conceptual character of language and the correlative need for 
judges to engage in rational thought about its meaning cannot be 
evaded. 
In truth, all Originalists chase a misguided solution. For the 
salient choice that a judge confronts when interpreting the law is 
not a question of time: then or now? "their" meaning, in the 
past, or "ours" today? The choice is between objective and non-
objective understandings of concepts. Only with a fuller, 
accurate grasp of what we are interpreting-of the objective 
meaning of language-can we articulate a proper method of how 
to interpret. This paper's exploration of some of the misguided 
epistemological presuppositions of Public Understanding 
Originalism is offered as a step in that direction. w 
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